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ABSTRACT 
  
DEVELOPMENT OF A WEB SERVICES SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
BASED ON .NET FRAMEWORK 
 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is an architectural style which allows 
interaction of diverse applications regardless of their platform, implementation 
languages and locations by utilizing generic and reliable services that can be used as 
application building block. SOA includes methodologies and strategies to follow in 
order to develop sophisticated applications and information systems. SOA is different 
from the traditional architectures as it has its own unique architectural characteristics 
and regulations, which needs to be analyzed and clarified so as to apply the information 
that should be included in the architectural model of SOA correctly to service based 
application development. The newest technology for SOA is web service technology 
which gains more and more importance as a technology to develop distributed service-
oriented applications. Web services are an emergent paradigm for implementing 
business collaborations over the web. Each service has an interface that is accessible 
through standard protocols and that describes the interaction capabilities of the service. 
This master's thesis primarily examines the web services concept of the .NET 
platform having the emphasis on secure communication. A case study demonstrates 
securing the communication between a web service and its clients through RIJNDAEL, 
3DES and RSA algorithms implemented on code based structure which uses the identity 
token, provided from identity web service, to validate the identity of the client and the 
status token provided from status web service in order to validate the status of the client. 
A number of tests are performed using different cryptographic algorithms and network 
settings for the communication in order to obtain operational values of these algorithms. 
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ÖZET 
 
.NET ÇERÇEVESİ TEMELLİ BİR WEB SERVİS GÜVENLİĞİ 
MİMARİSİ GELİŞTİRİLMESİ 
 
Servis yönelimli mimari, platform, uygulama dilleri ve konumları ne olursa 
olsun uygulama temel ilke olarak kullanılabilen kapsamlı ve güvenli servislerden 
faydalanılarak farklı uygulamaların etkileşimine izin veren mimari bir stildir.  Servis 
yönelimli mimari karmaşık uygulamalar ve bilişim sistemleri geliştirmek için yöntem 
ve stratejiler içerir. Servis yönelimli mimari geleneksel mimariden farklıdır çünkü doğru 
olarak servis bazlı uygulama geliştirmeye servis yönelimli mimarinin mimariye ilişkin 
modele dahil olması gereken bilgiyi uygulamak için analiz etmeye ve açıklamaya 
ihtiyaç duyulan kendine özgü eşsiz mimariye ilişkin karakteristiklere ve kurallara 
sahiptir. Servis yönelimli mimari için en yeni teknoloji dağıtık servis yönelimli 
uygulamaları geliştirmek için bir teknoloji olarak daha fazla önem kazanan web servis 
teknolojisidir. Web servisleri web üzerinde ticari ortaklıklar uygulamak için geliştirilen 
bir paradigmadır. Her servis standart protokollerce erişilebilinen ve servisin etkileşim 
kabiliyetlerini tanımlayan bir ara yüze sahiptir. 
Bu tez öncelikle güvenli iletişimde önemle üzerinde durulan. NET platformu 
kullanılarak geliştirilen web servisleri kavramını incelemektedir. Yapılan örnek olay 
incelemesi, istemcinin statüsünün geçerliliğini denetlemek için, web servisince 
sağlanılan kimlik belirteci kullanılmış olup, kod bazlı yapılarca uygulanan RIJNDAEL, 
3DES ve RSA algoritmaları kullanılarak, web servisleri ve onların istemcileri arasında 
güvenli iletişim sağlamayı ispatlamada kullanılmıştır. Bu algoritmaların işlevselliğini 
elde etmek için iletişim boyunca farklı kriptografik algoritmalar ve ağ ortamları 
kullanılarak bu algoritmaların operasyon değerlerinin belirlenmesi için testler 
yapılmıştır. 
 
 vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES............................................................................................... x 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1 
CHAPTER 2. SERVICE ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE ................................. 2 
2.1. Service Oriented Architecture Overview................................... 2 
2.1.1. SOA Entities and Characteritics......................................... 4 
2.1.2. Service Oriented Development .......................................... 6 
2.1.3. SOA Layered Architecture................................................. 8 
2.2. Technologies for Service Oriented Architecture...................... 10 
2.3. Web Services of .NET Framework .......................................... 13 
2.4. Security Mechanisms ............................................................... 13 
2.4.1. Symmetric Encryption and Message Confidentiality....... 15 
2.4.2. Public Key Cryptography and Message Authentication .. 17 
2.4.3. .NET Cryptography .......................................................... 17 
CHAPTER 3. WEB SERVICES SECURITY................................................... 20 
3.1. Web Services Security Overview............................................. 20 
3.2. Web Services Security Approaches ......................................... 21 
3.2.1. Web Services Security Technologies ............................... 23 
3.2.2. WS-Security Overview..................................................... 24 
3.3. WS-Security Example.............................................................. 25 
 
 
 vii 
 
CHAPTER 4. WEB SERVICES SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ................... 28 
4.1. Web Services Security Arhitecture .......................................... 28 
4.2. Web Services Security Scenario .............................................. 30 
4.3. Overview of Security System of Scenario ............................... 32 
4.3.1. Identity Security Token Service Process.......................... 34 
4.3.2. Credit Security Token Service Process ............................ 35 
4.3.3. Service Process................................................................. 36 
4.3.4. CipherToken Class Model................................................ 36 
4.3.5. Domain Model.................................................................. 37 
4.3.6. Client Class Model ........................................................... 38 
CHAPTER 5. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS .......................... 39 
5.1. Client Application .................................................................... 39 
5.2. Identity Security Token Services ............................................. 40 
5.3. Credit Rating Security Token Services .................................... 42 
5.4. Service Security Token Services.............................................. 43 
5.5. Experiments ............................................................................. 44 
5.6. Evaluation of the Experiments in Statistical Methods ............. 47 
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 52 
REFERENCES .................................................................................................. 54 
APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A. WS-SECURITY EXAMPLE SOAP MESSAGES.................. 58 
APPENDIX B. CLASS DIAGRAMS ............................................................... 64 
APPENDIX C. WEB SERVICES SOAP MESSAGE EXAMPLES ................ 70 
 
 viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure             Page 
Figure 2.1. Abstract Definition of Software Architecture .............................................. 2 
Figure 2.2. Service-based workflow for an e-commerce business ................................. 3 
Figure 2.3. Conceptual SOA solution.............................................................................. 4 
Figure 2.4. Service Oriented Architecture Conceptual Model ........................................ 5 
Figure 2.5. Service Based Development.......................................................................... 7 
Figure 2.6. Two-tier and Three-tier Architectural Models .............................................. 9 
Figure 2.7. The Layers of Service Oriented Architecture................................................ 9 
Figure 2.8. Web Service Architecture ........................................................................... 10 
Figure 2.9. SOAP over HTTP........................................................................................ 11 
Figure 2.10. Schematic layout of WSDL....................................................................... 12 
Figure 2.11. Simplified Model of Conventional Encryption ......................................... 15 
Figure 2.12. Encryption across a Packet-Switching Network ....................................... 16 
Figure 2.13. The symmetric algorithm hierarchy. ......................................................... 18 
Figure 2.14. The asymmetric algorithm class hierarchy................................................ 18 
Figure 3.1. Web Services Scenario with No Security.................................................... 21 
Figure 3.2. Point-to-point vs. End-to-end Security........................................................ 22 
Figure 3.3. Evolution of WS-Security Specification ..................................................... 24 
Figure 3.4. Web Services Security Specifications ......................................................... 25 
Figure 3.5. SOAP Message Security with WS-Security................................................ 26 
Figure 4.1. Architecture of WS-Security Handler in IBM WebSphere………..............29 
Figure 4.2. Scenario Flow………………………...…………………….……………...31 
Figure 4.3. Sequence Diagram of the Scenario ............................................................. 32 
 ix 
 
Figure 4.4. Authentication Process Flow....................................................................... 32 
Figure 4.5. Integrity Process Flow................................................................................. 33 
Figure 4.6. Key Exchange Flow .................................................................................... 34 
Figure A.1. SOAP message without WS-Security ........................................................ 57 
Figure A.2. SOAP Message with Authentication .......................................................... 57 
Figure A.3. SOAP Message with Integrity .................................................................... 58 
Figure A.4. SOAP Message with Confidentiality.......................................................... 61 
Figure B.1. Class Diagram of Identity STS ................................................................... 63 
Figure B.2. Class Diagram of Credit Status STS........................................................... 64 
Figure B.3. Class Diagram of Service STS ................................................................... 65 
Figure B.4. Cipher Token Class Diagram...................................................................... 66 
Figure B.5. Domain Model ............................................................................................ 67 
Figure B.6. Client Class Diagram.................................................................................. 68 
Figure C.1. SOAP Message Example For Identity Token Request From Client To 
Identity Token Web Service ....................................................................... 69 
 Figure C.2. SOAP Message Example For Identity Token Response From Identity     
STS to Client............................................................................................... 72 
Figure C.3. Client Request Information Open Message................................................ 75 
Figure C.4. IDToken Open Message ............................................................................. 75 
Figure C.5. SOAP Message Example For Credit Status Token Request From Client    
To CreditStatusSTS Web Service............................................................... 75 
Figure C.6. SOAP Message Example For Credit Status Token Response From       
Credit Status Token Web Service To Client…………………….………...80 
Figure C.7. Credit Status Token Open Message............................................................ 82 
Figure C.8. SOAP Message Example For Service Request From Client to             
Service Web Service…………………………………………………….…82 
 x 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table                  Page 
Table 2.1. Comparison of Architectural Development Models …………………….…...8 
Table 2.2. Security Mechanisms (X.800) ...…………………..………………………..14 
Table 2.3. Relationship between Security Services and Mechanisms ..………………..15 
Table 5.1. ANOVA Table of Complete Analyses of Variance Model …………….…..47 
Table 5.2. Means of Network Settings Effects …………………………………….…..48 
Table 5.3. Means of Symmetric Cryptographic Methods Effects ..…..…...…………...48 
Table 5.4. Means of Experiment Repetitions …………………...………...…………...49 
Table 5.5. The Analysis of Variance Table For Each Effects ......………...…………...49 
Table 5.6. Tukey's Studentized Range (HSD) Test To Compare The    
Levels of Network Settings …………………………………………………50 
 
 
 1 
 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
There is an increasing demand for technologies that support the connecting or 
sharing of resources and data in a very flexible and standardized manner. Because 
technologies and implementations vary across companies and even within divisions or 
departments, unified business processes could not be smoothly supported by 
technology. Integration is achievable only between units that are already aware of each 
other and that use the same static applications. 
Web services technology, which enables disparate systems to interoperate at a 
high level with ease, lacked a common framework for security. Although some attempts 
have been made to solve this problem, most of these attempts bring a solution using 
variations of technologies already in use. These techniques, which are actually proven 
in the field, do not fit with the interoperable and loosely coupled nature of web services 
technology. The new emerging Web Service Security (WS-Security) standard, along 
with other extensions of the WS-* group of technologies aims this lack of a common 
security framework (Atkinson, et al. 2002). 
The Web Services Security standard is formed by independent organizations 
backed by big vendors of the industry such as IBM, Microsoft, RSA, and Verisign. 
Although, some alignment in vision has been achieved, in practice there is an on going 
debate. This debate, although a good thing for advancement of technology, results in a 
slow penetration of technology. Proven products leveraging these technologies are still 
missing.  
This thesis aims to comprehensive and extensible suggested web services 
security architecture and provide and provide an implementation, understanding and 
efficiency of this new technology. The design and architecture of the case study 
examined in this thesis, is implemented using a mix of several web services security 
specifications. Although there are alternative specifications still competing to become 
de facto standards, we believe the selection of specifications had recently gained 
momentum and success in becoming a de facto standard is in the near future.  
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CHAPTER 2 
SERVICE ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE 
2.1 Service Oriented Architecture Overview 
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is an architectural style which utilizes 
methods and technologies that provides for enterprises to dynamically connect and 
communicate software applications between different business partners and platforms 
by offering generic and reliable services that can be used as application building blocks. 
In this way it is possible to develop richer and more advanced applications and 
information systems (Sun Microsystems Inc. 2006). 
Software development turns out to be more challenging as the needs and desires 
grows to have complex infrastructures capable of solving real-world problems. 
Similarly, technological improvements through many tendencies and alternatives 
grounds to build compound architectures for developing software systems. The 
architecture of software explores the software system infrastructure by describing its 
components and high level interactions between each of them. These components are 
abstract modules built as a “unit” with other components. The high level interactions 
between components are called “connectors”. The configuration of components and 
connectors describes the way a system is structured and behaves (McGovern, et al. 
2003), shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Abstract Definition of Software Architecture 
(Source: McGovern, et al. 2003) 
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The software architecture of a program or computing system is the structure or 
structures of the system, which comprise software components, the externally visible 
properties of those components, and the relationship among them (Bass, et al. 1997). To 
simplify the complexity of the architecture, conventionally, the system is built with 
modules, which involves functions, objects, components and services.  
Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is a particular type of software architecture 
which has distinguished features and characteristics. The concept of SOA emerged in 
the early 1980s (Magedanz, et al. 2007) and become a significant architectural style 
especially after invention of web services. Before examining the architecture in detail, it 
is important to evaluate the existing software development concepts and related 
technologies to discover the revolution of SOA so as to not to develop SOA from 
scratch. 
The concept of services is familiar to anyone who shops online at an e-
commerce web site. Once you place your order, you have to supply your credit card 
information, which is typically authorized and charged by an outside service vendor. 
Once the order has been committed, the e-commerce company coordinates with a 
shipping service vendor to deliver your purchase. E-commerce applications provide a 
perfect illustration of the need for an SOA. If the credit card billing component is 
offline or unresponsive, you do not want the sales order process to fail. Instead, you 
want the order to be collected and the billing operation to proceed at a later time.  
Figure 2.2 provides a conceptual workflow for an e-commerce business that uses 
multiple services to process orders (Hasan 2006). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Service-based workflow for an e-commerce business 
(Source: Hasan 2006) 
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Figure 2.3 shows a conceptual SOA that summarizes the three main entities in a 
typical SOA solution: 
− Service providers 
− Service consumers 
− Service directories 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Conceptual SOA solution 
(Source: Hasan 2006) 
 
 
2.1.1 SOA Entities and Characteristics 
Service Oriented Architecture is an architectural style that defines an interaction 
model between three main functional units, in which the consumer of the service 
interacts with the service provider to find out a service that matches its requirements 
through searching registry. A meta-model describing this interaction is shown in Figure 
2.4 below.  
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Figure 2.4. Service Oriented Architecture Conceptual Model 
(Source: McGovern, et al. 2003) 
 
SOA contains 6 entities in its conceptual model, described as follows 
(McGovern, et al. 2003): 
− Service Consumer  
− Service Provider 
− Service Registry 
− Service Contract 
− Service Proxy 
− Service Lease 
Service oriented architecture reflects specific principles and characteristics that 
need to be applied when building service-oriented application infrastructures (Sun 
Microsystems 2001), which are described as follows: 
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− Services are discoverable and dynamically bound 
− Services are self contained and modular 
− Services are interoperable 
− Services are loosely coupled 
− Services have a network-addressable interface 
− Services have coarse-grained interfaces 
− Services are location transparent 
− Services can be composed into new applications 
− SOA supports self-healing 
 
2.1.2 Service Oriented Development 
Services are the evolution of components in which multiple component 
interfaces form into a single interface to perform a specific function. A service is an 
abstract resource with the capability of performing a task (Booth and Haas 2004). 
Services have the potential reflection of business functions as well as technical task 
definitions. 
Services are designed and developed to support the following characteristics 
(Sehring 2006):  
− Each service defines a specific business function and can match to real-life 
activities 
− A service may have various procedures and operations 
− Services interact with other services and system components in a loosely 
coupled, message-oriented environment to accomplish business goals 
− Services has clearly defined interfaces and can be used by many different 
other services and applications 
− Services do not need to be in a distributed environment 
Figure 2.5 illustrates service based development in the context of components 
and objects. 
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Figure 2.5. Service Based Development 
(Source: Sehring 2006) 
 
 
The early architecture of software is based on structured design, which has rigid 
rules for the development of software constructs and limited support to enable robust 
and sophisticated application development. Object oriented technologies result in 
flexible software development that supports encapsulation of business logic through 
more coarser-grained functions and classes; however, the tangible benefits of robust 
application development are gained through the progression of components and 
services. The Table 2.1 discusses the characteristics and features of each software 
architectural models. 
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Table 2.1. Comparison of Architectural Development Models 
(Source: Sehring 2006) 
 
 
 
2.1.3 SOA Layered Architecture 
Currently the most frequently used application development model is based on 
three-tier architectural structure, which supports an additional layer between client and 
data storage tiers as shown Figure 2.6. The additional layer, called as business logic 
layer, provides code isolation from client and sharing of the application logic between 
various client implementations. It is a competent approach to software development for 
flexible managing of data and usage of system resources.  
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Figure 2.6. Two-tier and Three-tier Architectural Models 
(Source: Sehring 2006) 
 
SOA is based on n-tier application development in which services are layered on 
top of components that are responsible for providing certain functionalities and 
maintaining quality of service requirements for services (Sehring 2006), as shown in 
Figure 2.7. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7. The Layers of Service Oriented Architecture 
(Source: Sehring 2006) 
 10 
 
2.2 Technologies for Service Oriented Architecture 
The initial service-oriented technology was introduced in the late 1990s from 
Sun Microsystems, which is called as Jini Network Technology (Sun Microsystems 
2001). Jini is a lightweight environment for dynamically discovering and using services 
on a network. Its main aim is to allow devices such as printers to dynamically connect 
to the network and register their available services. 
Since Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) is an evolution of Object Oriented 
(component based architecture for separating functionality into individual objects that 
work together) and Distributed Systems such as J2EE, CORBA, and DCOM. Defining 
Web Services, .NET, J2EE and, CORBA as specialized SOA implementations that 
represent the core aspects of a service-oriented approach to service oriented 
architecture. 
Web services are distributed software components that can be accessed through 
standard web protocols as shown Figure 2.8. The advantage of web services is that they 
can be consumed by any application that is able to parse and XML-formatted stream 
transmitted through HTTP. XML is the key technology in web services.  
A web service is a component running on a web server that communicates to the 
world with standard Internet protocols such as: HTTP GET, HTTP POST, and SOAP 
(Simple Object Access Protocol).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.8. Web Service Architecture 
(Source: Sehring 2006) 
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XML is a standard that provides encoding to data as plain text files. This has  the  
significant  advantage  that  almost  anything  can  read  it,  as  text  files  are  standard  
across  platforms. There are standards to adhere  to,  such  as,  what  encoding  language  
to  use,  and  how  much  data  is  used  for  each  character,  but  these  are  
surmountable  on  all devices likely to be interested in web  services (Microsoft 
Corporation 2002). 
SOAP was originally designed as a means of manipulating objects remotely 
(W3Schools 2007).  Now  its  use  is  more  specialized,  and  is  used  almost  
exclusively  with web service implementation. The two technologies looked at above, 
XML and   XML schemas, are enough to exchange data with web services. The way 
two systems interact with each other across the Internet using SOAP is shown in Figure 
2.9 (RSA Laboratories 2007). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9. SOAP over HTTP 
(Source: RSA Laboratories 2007) 
 
Web services have an associated WSDL (Web Service Description Language) 
document describing all operations that a web service can perform. The  description of a 
web service operation consists of the data structures used, the  combinations of these 
data structures present in requests to and responses from the  service, the format of 
messages containing these requests and responses, and the  specific method of access 
required for  the different operations that are supported by  the service as shown Figure 
2.10. In order to achieve this, WSDL documents which are written in XML contain 
schema information, information associating schema definitions with message structure, 
and some HTTP and SOAP specific information. Given a WSDL document it is 
possible to write code to access the web service it pertains to without any additional 
information (Bustos and Watson 2002). 
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Figure  2.10. Schematic layout of WSDL 
(Source: Bustos and Watson 2002) 
 
A Proxy resides  on  the  consumer’s  machine  and  acts  as  a  relay  between  
the  consumer and the web service. When a proxy is built, it uses a WSDL file to create 
a map that tells the consumers what are the methods are available and how to call them 
(Birdwell and Cornes 2001). The consumer then calls the web method that is mapped in 
the proxy, which in  turn,  makes  calls  to  the  actual  web  service  over  the  Internet.  
The proxy handles the entire network related work including sending of data, as well as 
managing the underlying WSDL. 
WSDL accurately  defines  web  services,  but  this  is  not  sufficient  to  allow  
people  to  find  the  web  service (Curbera and Duftler 2002). If the web site is not 
known, it will not be possible to find the WSDL that describes it. Some central access 
or a repository that people can query in order to find web services is needed and UDDI 
is used for this purpose.  
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2.3 Web Services of .NET Framework 
All web services in .Net have the following elements (Thai and Lam 2000): 
1. An asmx file for the web service. This must contain the <% webservice 
... %> directive, as well as the class that provides the web service 
implementation. To the web wervice clients, this asmx file is the entry 
point to the web service. Instead of deploying as it is with Java 
Enterprise Edition (JEE) with .NET framework this file should be in a 
virtual directory with permits.  
2. Inherit from the web service class of the System.Web.Services 
namespace. This allows the derived class to access all the normal ASP 
objects exposed in the web service base class.  
3. Tag the methods that are going to be accessed on the web with 
WebMethod attributes.  
4. A configuration file called web.config is placed in the same directory as 
the asmx file. This configuration file controls many settings from the 
virtual directory. 
 
2.4 Security Mechanisms 
Table 2.2 lists the security mechanisms defined in X.800. As can be seen from 
the list, the mechanisms are divided into those that are implemented in a specific 
protocol layer and those that are not specific to any particular protocol layer or security 
service. X.800 distinguishes between reversible encipherment mechanisms and 
irreversible encipherment mechanisms (Stallings 2003). A reversible encipherment 
mechanism is simply an encryption algorithm that allows data to be encrypted and 
subsequently decrypted. Irreversible encipherment mechanisms include hash algorithms 
and message authentication codes, which are used in digital signature and message 
authentication applications. 
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Table 2.2 X.800 Security Mechanisms  
(Source: Stallings 2003) 
 
 
 
Table 2.3, based on one in X.800, indicates the relationship between security 
services and security mechanisms. X.800 defines a security service as a service 
provided by a protocol layer of communicating open systems, which ensures adequate 
security of the systems or of data transfers. A security service is a processing or 
communication service that is provided by a system to give a specific kind of protection 
to system resources; security services implement security policies and are implemented 
by security mechanisms (Stallings 2003). 
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Table 2.3 Relationship between Security Services and Mechanisms 
(Source: Stallings 2003) 
 
 
2.4.1 Symmetric Encryption and Message Confidentiality 
The most commonly used symmetric encryption algorithms are block ciphers. A 
block cipher processes the plaintext input in fixed-size blocks and produces a block of 
cipher text of equal size for each plaintext block. This thesis focuses on the three most 
important symmetric block ciphers: the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and Triple 
DES (3DES), and Rijndael. 
A symmetric encryption scheme has five ingredients shown on Figure 2.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11. Simplified Model of Conventional Encryption 
(Source: Stallings 2003) 
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The most powerful, and most common, approach to countering the threats to 
network security is encryption. In using encryption, we need to decide what to encrypt 
and where the encryption gear should be located. There are two fundamental 
alternatives; link encryption and end-to-end encryption; these are illustrated in use over 
a packet-switching network in Figure 2.12. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12. Encryption across a Packet-Switching Network 
(Source: Stallings 2003) 
 
One big issue with using symmetric algorithms is the key exchange problem. 
The other main issue is the problem of trust between two parties that share a secret 
symmetric key. Problems of trust may be encountered when encryption is used for 
authentication and integrity checking. A symmetric key can be used to verify the 
identity of the other communicating party, but this requires that one party trust the other 
(Thorsteinson and Ganesh 2003). 
 
Key distribution can be achieved in a number of ways. For two parties A and B, 
1. A key should he selected by A and physically delivered to B. 
2. A third party could select the key and physically deliver to A and B. 
3. If A and B have previously and recently used a key, one party could 
transmit the new key to the other, encrypted using the old key. 
4. If A and B each have an encrypted connection to a third party C, C could 
deliver a key on the encrypted links to A and B. 
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2.4.2 Public Key Cryptography and Message Authentication 
A message authentication code (MAC) is an authentication tag (also called a 
checksum) derived by applying an authentication scheme, together with a secret key, to 
a message. Unlike digital signatures, MACs are computed and verified with the same 
key, so that they can only be verified by the intended recipient. There are four types of 
MACs:  unconditionally secure, hash function-based, stream cipher-based, or block 
cipher-based (RSA Laboratories 2007). 
The use of cryptographic hash functions like MD5 or SHA for message 
authentication has become a standard approach in many Internet applications and 
protocols. Though very easy to implement, these mechanisms are usually based on ad 
hoc techniques that lack a sound security analysis (Bellare, et al. 1996). 
The SHA-1 is called secure because it is computationally infeasible to find a 
message which corresponds to a given message digest, or to find two different messages 
which produce the same message digest. Any change to a message in transit will, with 
very high probability, result in a different message digest, and the signature will fail to 
verify. SHA-1 is a technical revision of SHA (FIPS 180) (Federal Information 
Processing Standards Publication 1995). 
Public key cryptography, which uses a public key to encrypt the message and a 
private key to decrypt it. Public key systems are also known as asymmetric key 
cryptography. Public key cryptography is most often used for creating digital signatures 
on data, such as electronic mail, to certify the data's origin and integrity (Garfinkel and 
Spafford 1996).  
 
2.4.3 .NET Cryptography 
SymmetricAlgorithm has only one public constructor that takes no parameters. 
This constructor initializes the new instance with a randomly generated secret key. Of 
course, SymmetricAlgorithm also supports the standard methods Equals, Finalize, 
GetHashCode, ToString, GetType, and MemberwiseClone, which are defined in the 
base class Object. Figure 2.13 shows the symmetric algorithm class hierarchy. 
 18 
 
 
 
Figure 2.13. The symmetric algorithm hierarchy 
(Source: Thorsteinson and Ganesh 2003) 
 
AsymmetricAlgorithm has the similar methods and Figure 2.14 shows where 
AsymmetricAlgorithm class resides in the class hierarchy, under the abstract 
AsymmetricAlgorithm class.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.14. The asymmetric algorithm class hierarchy 
(Source: Thorsteinson and Ganesh 2003) 
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For digital signatures, it turns out that it is not actually necessary to encrypt the 
entire original message. It is entirely sufficient, as well as much more efficient, to 
generate a hash of the original message, and then just encrypt that smaller hash value 
with the private key. Anyone with the matching public key (i.e., everybody) can then 
decrypt that hash with the public key for verification purposes. If the decrypted hash 
matches the recalculated hash of the actual message received, then the receiver can be 
quite confident that the original message that generated the hash must also match the 
received message. This comes from the fact that it is extremely difficult to find any two 
inputs that produce the same hash output (Thorsteinson and Ganesh 2003). 
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CHAPTER 3 
WEB SERVICES SECURITY 
 
3.1 Web Services Security Overview 
There are seven requirements that must be addressed by a general security 
framework as defined by the ISO Security Standard (Wahli, et al. 2006): 
1. Identification 
2. Authentication 
3. Authorization 
4. Integrity 
5. Confidentiality 
6. Auditing 
7. Non-repudiation 
Web services security is one of the most important web services subjects. When 
using web services, similar security exposures exist as for other Internet, middleware-
based applications and communications. To demonstrate the web services security 
exposures, we are going to explain several major risk factors for a system with no 
security. Most common security risks have been depicted in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Web Services Scenario with No Security 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
 
3.2 Web Services Security Approaches 
Three fundamental concepts related to web services security exist from the 
perspective of web services architecture: the resources that must be secured, the 
mechanisms by which these resources are secured, and policies, which are machine-
processable documents describing constraints on these resources. 
Policies can be logically broken into two main types: permission policies and 
obligatory policies. A permission policy concerns those actions that an entity is 
permitted to perform and an obligatory policy concerns those actions that an entity is 
required to perform. Due to their nature, these two different kinds of policies have 
different types of enforcement mechanisms. A permission policy guard mechanism can 
be used to verify that a requested action is permitted to be performed by the entity, 
while the obligatory guard mechanism can only verify after the fact that an obligation 
has not been met. The architecture is principally concerned with the existence of such 
guard mechanisms and their role in the architecture. 
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Not all guards are active processes. For example, confidentiality of messages is 
provided by encryption. The guard here is the encryption itself, although this may be 
further backed up by active guards that apply policy. 
Traditional network level security mechanisms such as Transport Layer Security 
(SSL/TLS), Virtual Private Networks (VPN), IPSec (Internet Protocol Security), and 
Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Exchange (S/MIME) are point-to-point technologies. 
Although these traditional technologies may be used for web services security, they are 
not sufficient for providing an end-to-end security context, ad web services use a 
message oriented approach that enables complex interactions that can include the 
routing of messaged across various trust domains. 
Therefore, message level security is important as opposed to point-to-point 
transport level security. As can be seen in Figure 3.2 below, the security context of 
SOAP message is end-to-end. However, there may also be a need for the intermediary 
to have access to some information in the message. This is illustrated as a security 
context between the intermediary and the original requester agent, and the intermediary 
and the ultimate receiver 
You can send secured messages over many different protocols such as Simple 
Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP) without having to rely on the protocol for security (Microsoft 
Patterns and Practices Developer Center 2005). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Point-to-point vs. End-to-end Security 
(Source: W3C Working Group 2004) 
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HTTP, the most widely used Internet communication protocol, is currently also 
the most popular protocol for web services. HTTP is an inherently insecure protocol 
since all information is sent in clear text between unauthenticated peers over an insecure 
network. To secure HTTP transport-level security can be used. Transport-level security 
is a well known and often used mechanism for securing Internet and Intranet 
communications. It is based on Secure Sockets Layer or Transport Layer Security that 
works beneath HTTP. 
If a message needs to go through multiple points to reach its destination, each 
intermediate point must forward the message over a new SSL connection. In this model, 
the original message from the client is not cryptographically protected on each 
intermediary because it traverses intermediate servers and additional computationally 
expensive cryptographic operations are performed for every new SSL connection that is 
established (Microsoft Patterns and Practices Developer Center 2005). 
 
3.2.1 Web Services Security Technologies 
In web services, the SOAP envelope is defined in XML, thus, web services can 
use many of the existing XML security technologies and standards, such as XML 
encryption and XML Digital Signatures. In addition many new standards such as WS-
Security have emerged. The WS-Security is the cornerstone of all the efforts in pulling 
all these requirements together. The abstract of WS-Security specification document 
says that WS-Security describes enhancements to SOAP messaging to provide quality 
of protection through message integrity, message confidentiality, and single message 
authentication. These mechanisms can be used to accommodate a wide variety of 
security models and encryption technologies (IBM Feeds 2002). Other technologies in 
the process of standardization are XML Key Management Specification (XKMS) (Ford, 
et al. 2001), Secure Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (Campbell and Lockhart 
2007), Extensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) (Parducci and Lockhart 
2008), and Identity Federation (Raskin 2008). 
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3.2.2 WS-Security Overview 
Multiple parts of a message can be secured in different ways. Multiple security 
requirements can be applied, such as integrity on the security token, and confidentiality 
on the SOAP body. End-to-end message level security can be provided through any 
number of intermediaries. WS-Security works across multiple transports and is 
independent of the underlying transport. Authentication of multiple party identities is 
possible. 
The latest core specification, Web Services Security: SOAP Message Security 
1.0 (WS-Security 2004) was standardized in March 2004. The two profiles, Web 
Services Security Username Token Profile, and Web Services Security X.509 
Certificate Token Profile 1.0 were standardized at the same time. This evolution is 
presented in Figure 3.3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Evolution of WS-Security Specification 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
 25 
 
The web services security model introduces a set of individual interrelated 
specifications to form a layering approach to security (Wahli, et al. 2006). This layered 
architecture is presented in Figure 3.4. It includes several aspects of security: 
identification, authentication, authorization, integrity, confidentiality, auditing, and non-
repudiation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Web Services Security Specifications 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
 
3.3 WS-Security Example 
This section provides examples of SOAP messages with WS-Security. Using 
WS-Security, the authentication mechanism integrity, and confidentiality can be applied 
at the message level. As an overview, Figure 3.5 shows an example of web service 
security elements when the SOAP body is signed and encrypted. 
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Figure 3.5. SOAP Message Security with WS-Security 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
 
Figure A.1 shows the sample SOAP message without applying WS-Security. As 
you can see, there is only a SOAP body under the SOAP envelope. Applying WS-
Security, the SOAP security header will be inserted under the SOAP envelope.  
1. In Figure A.2, we show a message with authentication. As can be seen, 
we have username and password information as a <UsernameToken> tag 
in the message (Madsen 2006). When the username token is received by 
the web service server, the username and password are extracted and 
verified. Only when the username and password combination is valid 
will the message be accepted and processed at the server. 
Integrity is applied to the application to ensure that no one illegally modifies the 
message while it is in transit. Essentially, integrity is provided by generating an XML 
digital signature on the contents of the SOAP message. If the message data changes 
illegally, the signature would no longer be valid. 
Figure A.3 shows a sample SOAP message with integrity. Here the message 
body part is signed and added to the SOAP security header as signature information.  
A signature is based on a key that the sender is authorized to have. Unauthorized 
sniffers do not have this key. When the receiver gets the message, it too creates a 
signature using message contents. Only if the two signatures match does the receiver 
honor the message. If the signatures are different, a SOAP fault is returned to the 
sender. 
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 Figure A.4 shows a sample SOAP message with confidentiality. Here, the 
message body part is encrypted and a security header with encryption information 
added. Confidentiality is the process in which a SOAP message is protected so that only 
authorized recipients can read the SOAP message. Confidentiality is provided by 
encrypting the contents of the SOAP message using XML encryption. If the SOAP 
message is encrypted, only a service that knows the key can decrypt and read the 
message. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WEB SERVICES SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
4.1 Web Services Security Architecture 
We focus on WS-Security which is a basis for our implementation process on 
this thesis. Figure 4.1 is presented in order to understand WS-Security architecture. The 
processing of the architecture is performed as follows (Nakamura, et al. 2005): 
  
1. Requester invokes WSSGenerator. 
2. WSSGenerator invokes TokenGenerator to create a SecurityContextToken 
(SCT). 
3. Since no SCT is cached initially, TokenGenerator invokes CallbackHandler. 
4. CallbackHandler interacts with STS to get a Generic Service Security (GSS) 
Token and an SCT. 
5. TokenGenerator stores a GSS token associated with an identifier of the SCT. 
6. WSSGenerator invokes SigEngine, giving the SCT identifier. 
7. During the sign operation, SigEngine eventually needs a key indicated by the 
SCT identifier, so KeyLocator is invoked. 
8. KeyLocator finds a key with the identifier. 
9. SigEngine signs the message, using the provided key. 
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Figure 4.1. Architecture of WS-Security Handler in IBM WebSphere 
(Source: Nakamura, et al. 2005) 
 
On the other hand, when we focus on the implementation of the architecture the 
whole process explained step by step as follows: 
1. Requester invokes WSSGenerator: The client class manages the generation 
process on the Client application. 
2. WSSGenerator invokes TokenGenerator to create a SecurityContextToken 
(SCT): IDTokenGenerator and CreditTokenGenerator classes manage the token 
generation process. 
3. Since no SCT is cached initially, TokenGenerator invokes CallbackHandler: 
Client class manages this process. 
4. CallbackHandler interacts with STS to get a Generic Service Security (GSS) 
Token and an SCT:  On STS side; token generator classes manages this process. 
5. TokenGenerator stores a GSS token associated with an identifier of the SCT: 
This operation isn’t implemented due to the performance analysis. 
6. WSSGenerator invokes SigEngine, giving the SCT identifier: Signature 
Generation class manages that process. 
7. During the signing, SigEngine eventually needs a key indicated by the SCT 
identifier, so KeyLocator is invoked: KeyExchange class manages key Exchange 
operation between client and STS. Client creates KeyExchangeToken object 
which includes SessionKey object encrypted with RSA algorithm with STS’s 
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public key and sends to the STS. SignatureGeneration class operates signature 
process. SignatureClass signs the data with STS’s private key.  
8. KeyLocator finds a key with the identifier: STS’s main class finds the Certificate 
stored on the local machine. 
9. SigEngine signs the message, using the provided key: Certificate’s public and 
private keys uses for signature operations. 
10. For EncEngine process: Crypt interface is manages all symmetric encryption 
processes. 
After the introduction of the web services security architecture in the following 
topic, a scenario based on web services security architecture will be explained. 
 
4.2 Web Service Security Scenario 
The scenario which will be used for demonstration of proposed architecture is a 
real-life example of the WS-Security scenario. The requester is a citizen who would like 
to apply for a credit account to a bank. For his application to be honored, the service 
requests the applicant to present two security tokens, one obtained from the government 
verifying his identity, and another token from the factious agency of Board of Credit 
Rating which rates people’s credit status. When both tokens are acquired, the requester 
invokes the services web service and presents these tokens. The service verifies these 
tokens and according to the credit rating of the applicant, and decides to approve the 
credit request or not. 
There are 6 steps of the scenario shown in Figure 4.2 (Hendrickson 2006): 
1. The client requests an identification token from the identity security token 
service (IdentitySTS). 
2. The identity security token service processes the request security token (RST) 
and sends a response. 
3. The client requests a status token from the credit rating security token service 
(Credit Rating STS). 
4. The Credit Rating STS processes the request status token and sends a response 
5. The client sends a request to the service 
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6. The service processes the request, which includes identity security token and 
status token, and sends a response. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Scenario Flow 
(Source: Hendrickson 2006) 
 
The sequence diagram for the scenario flow is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Client 
application creates username, password information and transmits them to IdentitySTS 
web services. IdentitySTS web service uses information to verify the client and creates 
an identity token. Client application transmits the identity token, taken from 
IdentitySTS web service, to CreditRatingSTS web service to receive the credit status 
token. CreditRatingSTS uses identity token to determine the credit status and to create 
credit status token. Client application transmits the identity token and credit status token 
to service web service and service web service returns a response data after the 
verification processes of the tokens. 
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Figure 4.3. Sequence Diagram of the Scenario. 
 
4.3 Overview of Security System of Scenario 
The authentication security layer is provided between message level 
communication of client and IdentitySTS as shown Figure 4.4. Client creates username 
and password information. After the encryption approach with session key, client sends 
to the IdentitySTS to take an identity token behind the verification process by 
IdentitySTS. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Authentication Process Flow 
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The integrity security layer is provided between client and STS’s 
communication as shown Figure 4.5. After IDToken creation process of IdentitySTS, 
IdentitySTS firstly encrypts the IDToken with session key and signs the encrypted 
IDToken data through asymmetric private key of own certificate to perform the 
integrity security layer. When the client achieved the signed and encrypted IDToken 
sends to the CreditRatingSTS to obtain a CreditStatusToken. CreditRatingSTS first 
verifies the signature using with public key of the certificate of IdentitySTS. Behind 
verification complete, CreditRatingSTS creates a CreditStatusToken and encrypts the 
token with session key and signs the encrypted token data through asymmetric private 
key of own certificate to perform the integrity security layer. As the client achieved the 
signed and encrypted CreditStatusToken sends to the ServiceSTS to obtain an account. 
ServiceSTS verifies IDToken using the signature using with public key of the certificate 
of IdentitySTS and CreditStatusToken using the signature using through public key of 
the certificate of CreditRatingSTS. After verification process the service sends 
encrypted response. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Integrity Process Flow 
 
The confidentiality security layer is provided between client and STS’s 
communication. All communications between client and STS’s can be applied through a 
symmetric session key in cipher based. Session Key is selected by the user as Rijndael 
or Triple Des symmetric based algorithms. Session Key created by the client 
application. In order to perform this, as illustrated Figure 4.6, the session key is 
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performed into a key exchange method by using the asymmetric RSA algorithm. 
Ciphered session key is transmitted to STS’s by an attribute of web method. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Key Exchange Flow 
 
4.3.1 Identity Security Token Service Process 
In the first step of the scenario, the client has two choices which are 
cryptographic based communication or plain text based communication. Client calls the 
requestIDToken method in order to communicate in the cryptographic based. However, 
client calls the requestIDTokenPlain method in order to communicate in the plain text 
based communication.  
When the client calls the requestIDTokenPlain method, client sends a username 
token to the identity security token service (Identity STS) in plain text format. The 
identity STS is in charge of verifying credentials of the client using the username and 
password information. Identity STS verifies the username and password information by 
searching in a data store which involves the information about authorized clients. As 
seen on the Figure B.1, client calls the requestIDToken web method with the XML 
serialized ClientRequestInfos class type object attribute of the IdentitySTS web service 
in order to receive the identity token from the STS. The STS deserializes the XML 
serialized object and verifies the username and password information into the 
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ClientRequestInfos object by using check method of the IDCheck class which searches 
the data into the data store.  
As the second step, according to the verification process, the identity security 
token service response the requested identity token which includes the type of requested 
token, the type of token and the lifetime of the requested token. In order to create the 
identity token, which is an object would be able to create from IDToken class, the STS 
calls the generate method of IDTokenGenerator class. Behind of the creation of the 
identity token, the STS performs the XML type serialization approach and returns the 
IDToken object to the client. 
However, all these processes performed by the cryptographic based 
communication by the session key created by the client and sent to the IdentitySTS by 
the attribute of the requestIDToken web method. 
 
4.3.2 Credit Security Token Service Process 
In the third step of the scenario, the client again has two choices which are plain 
text or cryptographic based communication. Client calls the requestCreditStatus method 
in order to communicate in the cryptographic based but client calls the 
requestCreditStatus_PlainText method in order to communicate in the plain text based 
communication.  
When the client calls the requestCreditStatus_PlainText method, client sends an 
identity token taken from IdentitySTS to the credit status security token service (Credit 
STS) in plain text format. The Credit STS is in charge of verifying credentials of the 
IdentitySTS token which has been signed by private key of the IdentitySTS. As seen on 
the Figure B.2, client calls the requestCreditStatus web method with the XML serialized 
CipherToken class type object attribute of the IdentitySTS web service in order to 
receive the credit status token from the STS.  
As the forth step, according to the verification process, the credit status token 
service response the requested credit status token which includes the type of requested 
token, the type of token and the lifetime of the requested token. In order to create the 
credit status token, which is an object would be able to create from CreditStatusToken 
class, the STS calls the generate method of CreditStatusTokenGenerator class. Behind 
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of the creation of the credit status token, the STS performs the XML type serialization 
approach and returns the CreditStatusToken object to the client. However, all these 
processes performed by the cryptographic based communication by the session key 
created by the client and sent to the CreditSTS by the attribute of the 
requestCreditStatus web method. 
 
4.3.3 Service Process 
In the fifth step of the scenario, the client has two choices which are plain text or 
cryptographic based communication. Client calls the request method in order to 
communicate in the cryptographic based but client calls the request_Plain method in 
order to communicate in the plain text based communication.  
When the client calls the request_Plain method, client sends identity token taken 
from IdentitySTS and credit status token taken from CreditSTS to the service in plain 
text format. The service is in charge of verifying credentials of the IdentitySTS token 
and CreditSTS token which has been signed by private key of the IdentitySTS and 
CreditSTS. As seen on the Figure B.3, client calls the request_Plain web method with 
the XML serialized CipherToken class type object attributes of the IdentitySTS web 
service and CreditSTS web service in order to receive the data from the service.  
As the sixth step, according to the verification process, the service responses the 
requested data.  
However, all these processes performed by the cryptographic based 
communication by the session key created by the client and sends to the service by the 
attribute of the request web method. 
 
4.3.4 CipherToken Class Model 
The communication, made between client and STS’s, is based on ciphered data 
communication. The creation process for the cipher token first the data, which is a token 
(IDToken, CreditStatusToken), ciphered by a symmetric session key and stores into 
CipherData class. The creation times of the created tokens stores into the CreationTime 
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class which will be used for the statistical analysis. As shown Figure B.4, 
AuthenticationStatement class is utilized for storing the authentication time values 
which will be used for the statistical analysis and a pointer for KeyInfo class. 
CipherToken may also sign the ciphered data to ensure the integrity of the 
communication and the signature stores into the Signature class. The SignedInfo class 
which is pointed by the Signature class has all data for signature.  
 
4.3.5 Domain Model 
The domain model, represented on Figure B.5, designed for controlling all the 
messaging processes between client and web services. The Client calls the request 
method creates the three objects of ClientIdentitySTS, ClientCreditStatusSTS and 
ClientServiceSTS which are responsible for performing the communication by web 
services.  
ClientIdentitySTS class has requestIDToken which firstly checks the 
cryptographic communication approach chosen by the user on the graphic user 
interface, secondly if plain text based communication is chosen then calls the 
IdentitySTSservices requestIDTokenPlain web method by the attribute of client 
information data else if creates symmetric session key by the chosen cryptographic 
method, thirdly ciphers the session key by using the RSA algorithm with 
IdentitySTSservices private key, fourthly ciphers the client information by the session 
key, fifthly calls IdentitySTSservice web services requestIDToken web method by the 
attributes of session key and client information data. 
ClientCreditStatusSTS class has requestCipherToken_CreditStatusToken 
method which firstly checks the cryptographic communication approach chosen by the 
user on the graphic user interface, secondly if plain text based communication is chosen 
then calls the CreditStatusSTSservices requestCreditStatus_PlainText web method by 
the attribute of IDToken which received from IdentitySTSservice web service else if 
creates symmetric session key by the chosen cryptographic method, thirdly ciphers the 
session key by using the RSA algorithm with CreditStatusSTSservices private key, 
fourthly ciphers the IDToken by the session key, fifthly calls CreditStatusSTSservice 
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web services requestCreditStatus web method by the attributes of session key and 
IDToken data. 
ClientServiceSTS class has requestCipherToken_Service method which firstly 
checks the cryptographic communication approach chosen by the user on the graphic 
user interface, secondly if plain text based communication is chosen then calls the 
Service web service’s request_plain web method by the attribute of IDToken and 
CreditStatusToken which received from IdentitySTSservice and CreditStatusSTSservice 
web services else if creates symmetric session key by the chosen cryptographic 
method, thirdly ciphers the session key by using the RSA algorithm with Services 
private key, fourthly ciphers the IDToken and CreditStatusToken by the session key, 
fifthly calls Service web services request web method by the attributes of session key, 
IDToken and CreditStatusToken data. 
  
4.3.6 Client Class Model 
Except Client, ClientIdentitySTS, ClientCreditStatusSTS, ClientServiceSTS 
classes there are supporting classes as it is seen on the Figure B.6. Crypt interface 
manages the Cryptographic business to support the client. All token classes as IDToken, 
CreditStatusToken samples are also support client when XML serialization process. 
Client uses KeyExchange class to exchange the session key with web service by using 
the web services private keys. KeyExchangeToken has all information about session 
key and key Exchange information. Static type Serializer class operates the XML 
serialization approach between web services and client communication based on XML 
messaging system. XML messages converting the class object samples by using the 
Serializer class. Static type CryptAttribute class stores the information about 
cryptogragraphic keys and methods. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS 
5.1 Client Application 
The client application, which requests tokens and demands a service from 
service security token service, has console application interface which presents to enter 
symmetric encryption type and test number options. 
All time costs are saved to the files. All data will be used for performing 
statistical methods in order to test the communication type’s efficiency. 
 
All steps are described below for client application: 
 
1. Create an instance of IdentitySTS web service. 
2. Create a KeyExchange object to generate KeyExchangeToken object which 
contains sessionKeys encrypted with RSA algorithm utilizing with 
certificate of public key of IdentitySTS web service. 
3. Perform an XML serialization operation for CipherToken object which 
encapsulates encrypted KeyExchangeToken and encrypted 
ClientRequestInfos objects with session key, and pointed by cipherValue 
field, in order to send IdentitySTS web service. 
4. Request a CipherToken which encapsulates IDToken including digital 
signature from IdentitySTS web service by sending the attributes 
CipherToken objects encapsulates ClientRequestInfos and KeyExchange 
Token objects. Web method returns IDToken into the byte array encrypted 
by symmetric sessionKey algorithm. 
5. Perform an XML deserialization operation for CipherToken object 
encapsulates IDToken object to achieve performance time costs. 
6. Create an instance of CreditStatusSTS web service. 
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7. Perform XML serialization operation for CipherToken objects encapsulates 
encrypted KeyExchangeToken and encrypted IDToken objects, pointed by 
cipherValue field, in order to send CreditStatusSTS web service. 
8. Request a CipherToken object encapsulates CreditStatusToken object 
including digital signature from CreditStatusSTS web service by sending the 
attributes CipherToken objects encapsulates IDToken and 
KeyExchangeToken objects.  Web method returns CreditStatusToken into 
the byte array encrypted by symmetric sessionKey algorithm. 
9. Create an instance of ServiceSTS web service. 
10. Perform XML serialization operation CipherToken for KeyExchangeToken, 
CipherToken for IDToken, and CipherToken for CreditStatusToken in order 
to send to service web service. 
11. Request a service encapsulated into CipherToken object including digital 
signature from ServiceSTS web service by sending the attributes IDToken, 
CreditStatusToken and KeyExchangeToken objects encapsulated into 
CipherToken object.  Web method returns a response as affirmative or 
negatory into the byte array encrypted by symmetric sessionKey algorithm. 
All communication between client and STSs has been provided by SOAP 
envelopes. An example SOAP message taken the time of requesting IDToken is 
illustrated on Figure C.1. The open message of ClientRequestInfos object pointed to the 
cipherValue field of CipherToken object may be shown on Figure C.3. An example 
SOAP message taken the time of requesting CreditStatusToken is presented on Figure 
C.5. An example SOAP message taken the time of requesting the service data is 
illustrated on Figure C.8. 
 
5.2 Identity Security Token Services 
IdentitySTS web service has two web methods to provide options for client to 
choose plain text based communication or secured based communication. 
RequestIDTokenPlain web method using for plain text based communication requires 
one attribute which is ClientRequestInfos encapsulated by CipherToken object on plain 
text format. RequestIDToken web method using for secure based communication 
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requires two attribute KeyExchangeToken object which has encrypted fields with 
asymmetric RSA algorithm and ClientRequestInfos encrypted with session key 
encapsulated by CipherToken object. Fundamentally, the structure of the web methods 
is very similar. Only the decryption, encryption and signature creation processes added 
to the requestIDToken web method. All steps are described below for requestIDToken 
web method of IdentitySTS: 
1. Perform XML deserialization operation for Cipher Token object which 
encapsulates KeyExchangeToken object comes from client. 
2. Decrypt KeyExchangToken object fields to obtain session key with RSA 
algorithm uses private key of certificate of IdentitySTS. 
3. Create a SessionKey object which contains sessionKey information into 
plain text format. All information has been taken from decrypted 
KeyExchangeObject. 
4. Decrypt CipherObject which encapsulates ClientRequestInfos object with 
session key. 
5. Verify the identity information taken from decrypted ClientRequestInfos 
object using data store. 
6. If verified create an IDToken. 
7. Encrypt the IDToken with session key. 
8. Sign the encrypted IDToken data using with private key of certificate of 
IdentitySTS. 
9. Create a CipherToken object. 
10. Include encrypted IDToken data to cipherValue field of CipherToken object  
11. Include signature signatureValue field of CipherToken Object. 
12. Add all the time cost values to the CipherToken object fields. 
13. Return the CipherToken object. 
An example SOAP message taken the time of responding IDToken is illustrated 
on Figure C.2. The open message of IDToken object pointed to the cipherValue field of 
CipherToken object may be shown on Figure C.4. 
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5.3. Credit Rating Security Token Services 
CreditRatingSTS web service has two web methods to provide options for client 
to choose plain text based communication or secured based communication. 
requestCreditStatus_PlainText web method using for plain text based communication 
requires one attribute which is IDToken encapsulated by CipherToken object on plain 
text format. RequestCreditStatus web method using for secure based communication 
requires two attribute KeyExchangeToken object which has encrypted fields with 
asymmetric RSA algorithm and IDToken object encrypted with session key 
encapsulated by CipherToken object. Fundamentally, the structure of the web methods 
is very similar. Only the decryption, encryption and signature verification-creation 
processes added to the requestCreditStatus web method. All steps are described below 
for requestCreditStatus web method of IdentitySTS: 
1. Perform XML deserialization operation for CipherToken object which 
encapsulates KeyExchangeToken object. 
2. Decrypt KeyExchangeToken object fields to obtain session key with RSA 
algorithm uses private key of certificate of CreditRatingSTS. 
3. Create a SessionKey object which contains sessionKey information into 
plain text format. All information has been taken from decrypted 
KeyExchangeObject. 
4. Decrypt CipherObject which encapsulates encrypted IDToken object and its 
signature data with session key. 
5. Verify the signature using with the public key of certificate of IdentitySTS 
and lifetime of the IDToken. 
6. Create a CreditStatusToken if verified. 
7. Encrypt the CreditStatusToken with session key. 
8. Sign the encrypted CreditStatusToken data using with private key of 
certificate of CreditRatingSTS. 
9. Create a CipherToken object. 
10. Include encrypted CreditStatusToken data to cipherValue field of 
CipherToken object. 
11. Include signature signatureValue field of CipherToken Object. 
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12. Add all the time cost values to the CipherToken object fields. 
13. Return the CipherToken object. 
An example SOAP message taken the time of responding CreditStatusToken is 
illustrated on Figure C.6. The open message of CreditStatusToken object pointed to the 
cipherValue field of CipherToken object may be shown on Figure C.7. 
 
5.4 Service Security Token Services 
ServiceSTS web service has two web methods to provide options for client to 
choose plain text based communication or secured based communication. 
Request_Plain web method using for plain text based communication requires two 
attribute which is IDToken encapsulated by CipherToken object on plain text format 
and CreditStatusToken encapsulated by CipherToken object on plain text format. 
Request web method using for secure based communication requires three attribute 
KeyExchangeToken objects which has encrypted fields with asymmetric RSA 
algorithm, IDToken object encrypted with session key encapsulated by CipherToken 
object and CreditStatusToken object encrypted with session key encapsulated by 
CipherToken object. Fundamentally, the structure of the web methods is very similar. 
Only the decryption, encryption and signature verification-creation processes added to 
the request web method. All steps are described below for request web method of 
ServiceSTS: 
1. Perform XML deserialization operation for CipherToken object which 
encapsulates KeyExchangeToken object. 
2. Decrypt KeyExchangToken object fields to obtain session key with RSA 
algorithm uses private key of certificate of ServiceSTS. 
3. Create a SessionKey object which contains sessionKey information into 
plain text format. All information has been taken from decrypted 
KeyExchangeObject. 
4. Decrypt CipherObject which encapsulates encrypted IDToken object and its 
signature data with session key. 
5. Decrypt another CipherObject which encapsulates encrypted 
CreditStatusToken object and its signature data with session key. 
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6. Verify both signatures using with the public key of certificate of 
IdentitySTS, CreditStatusSTS and lifetimes of the IDToken, 
CreditStatusToken. 
7. Create a service data if both verified. 
8. Encrypt the service data with session key. 
9. Sign the encrypted service data using with private key of certificate of 
ServiceSTS. 
10. Create a CipherToken object. 
11. Include encrypted service data to cipherValue field of CipherToken object. 
12. Include signature signatureValue field of CipherToken Object. 
13. Add all the time cost values to the CipherToken object fields. 
14. Return the CipherToken object. 
To sum up, all the processes of the implementation of our scenario has been 
explained step by step. In the next topic, experiments and its results will be presented in 
detail. 
 
5.5 Experiments 
In order to obtain operational values of distributed web services security 
architecture, a number of tests are performed using different cryptographic based 
algorithms. These tests are performed into the laboratory on four different computers 
the specifications of the computers written below: 
1. Client Computer Specifications  
• Pentium 4 CPU 3.4 GHZ 
• 2.00 GB RAM 
• Windows XP SP2 Operating System  
• .Net Framework 2.0 
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2. IdentitySTS Computer Specifications 
• Pentium 4 CPU 2.00 GHZ 
• 512 MB RAM 
• Windows XP SP2 Operating System  
• .Net Framework 2.0 
3. CreditStatusSTS Computer Specifications  
• Pentium 4 CPU 3.00 GHZ 
• 2.00 GB RAM 
• Windows XP SP2 Operating System  
• .Net Framework 2.0 
4. ServiceSTS Computer Specifications  
• Pentium 4 CPU 3.40 GHZ 
• 2.00 GB RAM 
• Windows XP SP2 Operating System 
• .Net Framework 2.0 
 
Service Security Services built into Internet Information Service 5.1 (IIS 5.1) on 
the top of .Net Framework 2.0 environment. Client application executes on the .Net 
Framework 2.0 environment. The results also affected operational system and .Net 
framework noises and background processes. Eliminating these problems is impossible. 
Due to that, evaluation of the performance results must be performed considering the 
background noise problem. The cryptographic algorithms specification is listed below: 
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1. Triple DES Algorithm 
• Triple DES BlockSize = 64 
• Triple DES FeedBackSize = 8 
• Triple DES Initialization Vector Length = 8 
• Triple DES Key Size = 192 
• Triple DES Mode = CBC 
• Triple DES Padding Mode = PKCS7 
2. Rijndael Algorithm 
• Rijndael BlockSize = 128 
• Rijndael FeedBackSize = 128 
• Rijndael Initialization Vector Length = 16 
• Rijndael Key Size = 256 
• Rijndael Mode = CBC 
• Rijndael Padding Mode = PKCS7 
3. RSA Algorithm 
• RSA KeyExchangeAlgorithm = RSA-PKCS1-KeyEx 
• RSA KeySize = 1024 
• RSA SignatureAlgorithm = http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-
sha1 
 
The target is the observation statistically of Rijndael, Triple DES 
communications measurements on the .Net Framework 2.0 in different network settings. 
In order to obtain the time cost of each cycles test samples have been taken for each 
cryptographic based communication algorithms.  
In order to observe the network settings effects three different network location 
has been used which are local, distributed and two computer network locations. In local 
structure all service and client application has been set up to client computer. In 
distributed structure all services and client application has been set up own machine. In 
two computer structure is all service has been set up to CreditStatusSTS computer and 
client application has been set up to client computer. 
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5.6 Evaluation of the Experiments in Statistical Methods 
The analysis of variance (ANOVA) (Montgomery 1997) has been utilized for 
statistically evaluation of the data of the experiments. Analysis of variance is a 
statistical technique for analyzing experimental data. It subdivides the total variation of 
a data set into meaningful component parts associated with specific sources of variation 
in order to test a hypothesis on the parameters of the model. 
16 replicated 2*3 factorial experiment (Montgomery 1997), which has 
symmetric cryptographic methods (Rijndael and Triple DES) and network settings 
(Local, Distributed and Two Computer) are factors, has been used. In this design, the 
symmetric cryptographic methods factor which is Rijndael and Triple DES is two level 
and the network settings factor consists of three level (Local, Distributed and Two 
Computer). All data has been obtained by calculating the means of 500 measurements. 
The aim of the choice of factorial design is to determine the interactions between 
the factors which are to designate the effects. All experiments, which have been 
performed four times a day, have been consummated in four days (08-11.09.2008). 
The ANOVA table shown in Table 5.1, which has been obtained complete 
analyses of variance model, is below. The model involving symmetric cryptographic 
methods, network settings and interaction effects. This model has been determined as 
statistically significant model (F = 32.19, P < 0.0001). 
 
Table 5.1. ANOVA Table of Complete Analyses of Variance Model 
 
Source DF Sum of Squares 
Mean 
Square F Value Pr > F 
Model 20 0.48137131 0.02406857 32.19 <.0001 
Error 75 0.05607238 0.00074763     
Corrected 
Total 95 0.53744369       
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Means of main effects of response times which has been included in the model 
presented on Table 5.2, Table 5.3 and Table 5.4. After the analysis of variance, network 
settings effect included in model has been determined as statistically significant 
(F=103.86, P<0.0001). If time effects considered as block effect, time effects has been 
determined as statistically significant (F = 29.05, P < 0.0001). Symmetric cryptographic 
effect has been determined as statistically insignificant (F= 0.29, P = 0.5899). The 
interaction of symmetric cryptographic methods and network settings has been 
determined as statistically insignificant (F = 0.06, P = 0.9448) as shown on Table 5.5.  
Statistically insignificant interaction affects exhibits that symmetric cryptographic 
methods (Rijndael and Triple DES) react as independently through network settings 
(Local, Distributed and Two computer) vice versa.  
 
Table 5.2. Means of Network Settings Effects 
 
Level of score 
NETWORK 
SETTINGS 
N 
Mean Std Dev 
2 Computer 
32 0.44743359 0.05480471 
Distributed 
32 0.50733984 0.05762563 
Local 
32 0.54511914 0.07748063 
 
 
Table 5.3. Means of Symmetric Cryptographic Methods Effects 
 
Level of score 
Cryptographic 
Methods 
N 
Mean Std Dev 
Rijndael 
48 0.49845378 0.07529177 
Triple DES 
48 0.50147461 0.07590430 
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Table 5.4. Means of Experiment Repetitions 
 
Level of score 
Repetition 
N 
Mean Std Dev 
1 6 0.41628125 0.03436473 
2 6 0.41517708 0.03352135 
3 6 0.42054688 0.03689504 
4 6 0.47943229 0.12119088 
5 6 0.58668229 0.06460875 
6 6 0.58857813 0.05572307 
7 6 0.59486979 0.06464872 
8 6 0.58821354 0.05668958 
9 6 0.49957292 0.02650188 
10 6 0.48925000 0.03510945 
11 6 0.49131250 0.02896885 
12 6 0.48823438 0.03706502 
13 6 0.48945313 0.03684678 
14 6 0.48391667 0.03262721 
15 6 0.48425000 0.04101718 
16 6 0.48365625 0.03248284 
 
 
Table 5.5. The Analysis of Variance Table For Each Effects 
 
Source DF Type I SS Mean Square F Value Pr > F 
NETWORK 
SETTINGS 2 0.15529067 0.07764533 103.86 <.0001 
Cryptographic 
Method 1 0.00021901 0.00021901 0.29 0.5899 
Repetition 15 0.32577668 0.02171845 29.05 <.0001 
Network 
Settings* 
Cryptographic 
Method 
2 0.00008495 0.00004247 0.06 0.9448 
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After the analysis of variance, Tukey's Studentized Range (HSD) Test has been 
used to compare the levels of network settings effect determined as statistically 
significant as shown on Table 5.6. The statistically significant difference has been 
determined for all network settings levels. 
 
Table 5.6. Tukey's Studentized Range (HSD) Test To Compare The Levels of Network 
Settings 
 
Comparisons significant at the 0.05 level are indicated by ***. 
Network 
Settings Difference
Comparison Between
   Means
Simultaneous 95% 
Confidence Limits   
Local    - 
Distributed 
0.037779 0.021434 0.054124 *** 
Local    -         
2 Computer 
0.097686 0.081340 0.114031 *** 
Distributed – 
Local 
-0.037779 -0.054124 -0.021434 *** 
Distributed –     
2 Computer 
0.059906 0.043561 0.076251 *** 
2 Computer – 
Local 
-0.097686 -0.114031 -0.081340 *** 
2 Computer - 
Distributed 
-0.059906 -0.076251 -0.043561 *** 
 
 
At the beginning of the experiments, the expected experiment results are 
definition of difference between network settings effect and symmetric cryptographic 
methods effect considering interaction with each other. Although expected results were 
determination of the statistically significant difference between symmetric 
cryptographic methods effect, statistical analysis couldn’t discover the statistically 
significant effect for cryptographic methods Rijndael and Triple DES and interaction 
between network settings. The expected result for the network settings has been 
observed since the network settings effect has been determined statistically significant. 
As illustrated on Table 5.2, while considering the response times of our implementation 
of development of a web services security architecture based on .Net framework, the 
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shortest response time belongs to two computer network setting the second belongs to 
distributed network setting and the  longest response time belongs to local network 
setting. These results must be commented considering the background noise of .Net 
Framework 2.0 and Windows XP since it is impossible eliminating and forecasting the 
noise of these platforms. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
In this thesis, the foundations for a more comprehensive framework for securing 
web services have been laid. The suggested architecture demonstrates an example of 
trust brokering for various purposes. The fact that each of the actors is located in 
different security domains can be considered as a hint for implementing a federation 
framework for service oriented architectures. 
The Scenario have been chosen by considering four fundamental ingredients,  
which are authentication, authorization, integrity and confidentiality, of distributed web 
services security architecture. This scenario is implemented on the .NET Framework.  
Web Service Security Architecture application only runs with tokens by using 
cryptographic algorithms on .NET Framework 2.0. The service verifies the tokens are 
valid or not and response a message by considering the tokens validation process. All 
processes time costs calculated and saved on a file to comment the efficiency and 
performance of the security ingredients cost of the architecture. 16 replicated 2*3 
factorial experiment (Montgomery 1997), which has symmetric cryptographic methods 
(Rijndael and Triple DES) and network settings (Local, Distributed and Two Computer) 
are factors, has been used. In this design, the symmetric cryptographic methods factor 
which are Rijndael and Triple DES is two level and the network settings factor consists 
of three level (Local, Distributed and Two Computer). All data has been obtained by 
calculating the means of 500 measurements. Statistical analysis couldn’t discover the 
statistically significant effect for cryptographic methods Rijndael and Triple DES and 
interaction among network settings. While considering the response times of our 
implementation of development of web service security architecture based on .Net 
framework, the shortest response time belongs to two computer network setting the 
followed by distributed network setting and the longest response time belongs to local 
network setting. These results must be commented considering the background noise of 
.Net Framework 2.0 and Windows XP since it is impossible eliminating and forecasting 
the noise of these platforms. 
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As a future work, other extensions such as support for different security tokens 
like Kerberos tokens can be added to this architecture. In order to discover the shortest 
response time, the properties of symmetric algorithms (Rijndael and Triple DES) may 
also be modified and a new experiment design can be performed for these new 
properties. For more robust key exchange operation, the properties of asymmetric 
algorithm (RSA) may be modified and the response times may be analyzed statistically. 
Background noises, which are impossible to eliminate, may be deeply analyzed 
statistically to find a function or a period to understand the attitude of the effects. 
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APPENDIX A 
WS-SECURITY EXAMPLE SOAP MESSAGES 
 
<soapenv:Envelope 
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
      <soapenv:Header/> <soapenv:Body> 
      <p821:getDayForecast xmlns:p821="http://bean.itso"> 
            <theDate>2004-11-25T15:00:00.000Z</theDate> 
      </p821:getDayForecast></soapenv:Body> 
      </soapenv:Envelope> 
 
Figure A.1 SOAP message without WS-Security 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
 
 
Figure A.2 SOAP Message with Authentication 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
 
<soapenv:Envelope 
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
<soapenv:Header> <wsse:Security soapenv:mustUnderstand="1" 
 xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-
200401 - wsswssecurity- secext-1.0.xsd"> 
<wsse:UsernameToken><wsse:Username>David</wsse:Username> 
<wsse:Password Type="http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wssusername- token-
profile-1.0#PasswordText">divaD</wsse:Password> 
            </wsse:UsernameToken> 
         </wsse:Security> 
      </soapenv:Header><soapenv:Body> <p821:getDayForecast 
xmlns:p821="http://bean.itso"><theDate>2004-11-
25T15:00:00.000Z</theDate> </p821:getDayForecast> 
      </soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
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<saml:Assertion AssertionID="SecurityToken-07dc7c16-9a42-
4100-ad21-13013b975f3c" 
MajorVersion="1" MinorVersion="1" 
Issuer="http://localhost/SamlSecurityTokenService/SamlToken
Issuer.ashx" 
IssueInstant="2005-11-29T22:36:03Z" 
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion"> 
<saml:Conditions NotBefore="2005-11-29T22:36:03Z" 
NotOnOrAfter="2005-11- 
30T02:36:03Z"> 
<saml:AudienceRestrictionCondition> 
<saml:Audience> 
http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/08/addressing/role/anony
mous 
</saml:Audience> 
</saml:AudienceRestrictionCondition> 
</saml:Conditions> 
<saml:AuthenticationStatement 
AuthenticationMethod="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:am:passwo
rd" 
AuthenticationInstant="2005-11-29T22:36:03Z"> 
<saml:Subject> 
<saml:NameIdentifier 
Format="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/01/Federation/us
ername">RDALAPTOP02\wseuser</saml:NameIdentifier> 
<saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
<saml:ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:hol
der-ofkey</ 
saml:ConfirmationMethod> 
<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<xenc:EncryptedKey 
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
<xenc:EncryptionMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5" /> 
<KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
<wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasisopen. 
org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" 
EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-
200401-wss-soapmessage- 
security- 
1.0#Base64Binary">aAI1zTqHbhsUN6j2HsIefWcHODs=</wsse:KeyIde
ntifier> 
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
</KeyInfo> 
 
Figure A.3 SOAP Message with Integrity 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
(Cont. on next page) 
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<xenc:CipherData> 
<xenc:CipherValue>cSrRHLh8DWeELh5Naf34z515OIs0sw6hp4/zUIOnb
OFNj1lxQdXCTi7z3aaLu4Xi 
ws8vF3YdzD9LD/bQ1+QzzI7qcR4eDLNnxjZU87DkCBxI4ygqyB+Mx4J2lKL
Yl+rxI 
OVOVcjbd64/YngQu5 
AgZKBxNZv7GIcla0d3Ikebyr4=</xenc:CipherValue> 
</xenc:CipherData> 
</xenc:EncryptedKey> 
</ds:KeyInfo> 
</saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
</saml:Subject> 
<saml:SubjectLocality IPAddress="192.168.0.10" 
DNSAddress="CLIENTHOST" /> 
</saml:AuthenticationStatement> 
<saml:AttributeStatement> 
<saml:Subject> 
<saml:NameIdentifier 
Format="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/01/Federation/us
ername">RDALAPTOP02\wseuser</saml:NameIdentifier> 
<saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
<saml:ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:hol
der-ofkey</saml:ConfirmationMethod> 
<ds:KeyInfo xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<xenc:EncryptedKey 
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
<xenc:EncryptionMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5" /> 
<KeyInfo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
<wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasisopen. 
org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" 
EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-
200401-wss-soapmessage- 
security- 
1.0#Base64Binary">aAI1zTqHbhsUN6j2HsIefWcHODs=</wsse:KeyIde
ntifier> 
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
</KeyInfo> 
<xenc:CipherData> 
<xenc:CipherValue>cSrRHLh8DWeELh5Naf34z515OIs0sw6hp4/zUIOnb
OFNj1lxQdXCTi7z3aaLu4Xi 
ws8vF3YdzD9LD/bQ1+QzzI7qcR4eDLNnxjZU87DkCBxI4ygqyB+Mx4J2lKL
Yl+rxIOVOVcjbd64/YngQu5 
AgZKBxNZv7GIcla0d3Ikebyr4=</xenc:CipherValue> 
 
Figure A.3 (cont.) SOAP Message with Integrity 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
(Cont. on next page) 
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</xenc:CipherData> 
</xenc:EncryptedKey> 
</ds:KeyInfo> 
</saml:SubjectConfirmation> 
</saml:Subject> 
<saml:Attribute AttributeName="group" 
AttributeNamespace="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2004/01/F
ederation/group"> 
<saml:AttributeValue>BUILTIN\Users</saml:AttributeValue> 
</saml:Attribute> 
</saml:AttributeStatement> 
<Signature xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
<SignedInfo> 
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-excc14n#" 
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#" /> 
 
<SignatureMethod  
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/> 
<Reference URI="#SecurityToken-07dc7c16-9a42-4100-ad21-
13013b975f3c"> 
<Transforms> 
<Transform 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#envelopedsigna
ture" 
/> 
<Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-
c14n#" /> 
</Transforms> 
<DigestMethod 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1" /> 
<DigestValue>k2PBIDmwJLlQIh/GA4bVPgk1544=</DigestValue> 
</Reference> 
</SignedInfo> 
<SignatureValue>CZPQJvc2vpjKyio6EEJTQShHGlJff1hZubOWSDCbRrb
SFkK53fOp9Ugulfel6vvs9y 
ZfFJB2ieRAPK3ywUrRWTKvO7vjXP9HRGgrvqGC2PpQNAEYn7ciBkLM+VoJV
5vWfIopVevEYvnxFMFZlJTl 
LSOr0n+GWYaZuUYFJECfHaE=</SignatureValue> 
<KeyInfo> 
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
<wsse:KeyIdentifier ValueType="http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wss/oasiswss- 
soap-message-security-1.1#ThumbprintSHA1" 
EncodingType="http://docs.oasisopen. 
 
Figure A.3 (cont.) SOAP Message with Integrity 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
(Cont. on next page) 
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org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security- 
1.0#Base64Binary">vLfjdZyxqw+ztcYkVVQX8wyXp5o=</wsse:KeyIde 
ntifier> 
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
</KeyInfo> 
</Signature> 
</saml:Assertion> 
 
Figure A.3 (cont.) SOAP Message with Integrity 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
 
<soapenv:Envelope 
xmlns:soapenc="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/encoding/" 
xmlns:soapenv="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/" 
      xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
       
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"> 
      <soapenv:Header> 
            <wsu:Timestamp 
                  xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-ws 
                  security-utility-1.0.xsd"> 
                  <wsu:Created>2004-11-
26T09:34:50.838Z</wsu:Created> 
             </wsu:Timestamp> 
             <wsse:Security soapenv:mustUnderstand="1" 
                  xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-
open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-w 
                  ssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"> 
                    <EncryptedKey 
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
                          
 <EncryptionMethod 
                                 
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-1_5"/> 
                                 <ds:KeyInfo 
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> 
                                       
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                                       <wsse:KeyIdentifier 
                                       
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis- 
                                     200401-wss-x509-token- 
 
Figure A.4 SOAP Message with Confidentiality 
(Source: Wahli, et al. 2006) 
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profile-1.0#X509v3SubjectKeyIdentifier"> 
Vniy7MUOXBumPoH1MNbDpiIWOPA=                                        
</wsse:KeyIdentifier>                                        
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference> 
                                  </ds:KeyInfo>                      
<CipherData> 
                                 <CipherValue> 
O+2mTsRjU1iNlwANv1kGdzpkRV1GQc5epAT3p5Eg5UNAJ3H3YAX5VrdgMQm
j1 
wzdSZLDEzBtcHPJq3c8c0AgmAy9EVdcgXIn/ZeV+80jMDn/HN2HfodYjURt
IYBg48 
 
0SSkot0fy+YpBSXNR/MTfs1HT2H/Mjw/CyIbomWdQZHmE=             
</CipherValue>                             
</CipherData> 
<ReferenceList> 
                    
<DataReferenceURI="#wssecurity_encryption_id_68669508378406
88804"/> 
                            </ReferenceList> 
                    </EncryptedKey> 
            </wsse:Security> 
      </soapenv:Header> 
      <soapenv:Body> 
            <EncryptedData 
                  
Id="wssecurity_encryption_id_6866950837840688804" 
                  
Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content" 
                  
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#"> 
                  <EncryptionMethod 
                        
Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#tripledes-
cbc"/> 
                  <CipherData> 
                        <CipherValue> 
OvLekOlbuZhFBllBNL4Kos195YHwYw0kSbMxkbI2pk7nl17g0prPS2Ba2hy
rXHABGQVmosWpgqt+zijCPHUQCMwmm3qgFraK11DPMmwP94HvgxlgBmPw1U
nt+WM4aKLNrHDnwwcQX5RO7KT+fhFp4wxFEABwfHqzvTGNK3xRwJE= 
                         </CipherValue> 
                  </CipherData> 
            </EncryptedData> 
      </soapenv:Body> 
</soapenv:Envelope> 
 
Figure A.4 (cont.) SOAP Message with Confidentiality 
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Figure B.1. Class Diagram of Identity STS 
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Figure B.2. Class Diagram of Credit Status STS 
 65 
 
 
 
Figure B.3. Class Diagram of Service STS 
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Figure B.4. Cipher Token Class Diagram 
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Figure B.5. Domain Model 
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Figure B.6. Client Class Diagram 
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APPENDIX C 
WEB SERVICES SOAP MESSAGE EXAMPLES 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
  <soap:Body> 
    <requestIDToken xmlns="http://tempuri.org/"> 
      <serializedCipherToken_KeyExchangeToken> 
<CipherToken xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <Conditions> 
    <notBefore>2008-05-25T21:41:52.546875+03:00</notBefore> 
<notOnOrAfter>2008-05-
25T21:56:52.546875+03:00</notOnOrAfter> 
  </Conditions> 
  <AuthenticationStatement> 
    <KeyInfo> 
      <CipherData>        
<cipherValue>PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0idXRmLT
E2Ij8+DQo8S2V5RXhjaGFuZ2VUb2tlbiB4bWxuczp4c2k9Imh0dHA6Ly93d
3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDEvWE1MU2NoZW1hLWluc3RhbmNlIiB4bWxuczp4c2Q9
Imh0dHA6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDEvWE1MU2NoZW1hIj4NCiAgPGVuY3J 
5cHRlZFNlc3Npb25LZXk+cldUbllBaGZld0pQOHZPaU1EUExuOU1iZElPMU 
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Fvc1FUT3A3NTk1aFd5NkpoZlVrUTJNZllnV2pQc0xFajh0aExEUFJBZDJXb 
WFKbDVRa2hxa0ZGS29POVdOMmFudU1neHdURE5LUnU2RGprMjhuMnpmTmZJ
aXdLazJQVDVEc0RaWUdpTHlBZkRRRFNFTUh0QlUxREFlTlpzSXpiaEtqaWN
tOWtid2xPSC9JPTwvZW5jcnlwdGVkU2Vzc2lvbktleT4NCiAgPHN5bW1ldH
JpY0FsZ29yaXRobVR5cGU+QUVTPC9zeW1tZXRyaWNBbGdvcml0aG1UeXBlP
g0KICA8ZW5jcnlwdGVkU2Vzc2lvbktleUlWPmd5OXR4b3grVVFSUU1QVFFX
TTRTZ3lqUU90WDFUUEQzS0g5d3Rua1J4WGw1c0JLUUtUWFRvL2FXcWMzbzV
ENXgrUHBmVDlyQ1dFSGprK09KdWY3b2xFalNubE9LSkNFUUtuZlFIUktBV1
U4YmhRKyttckl4eU10bjFBeC8xOS9IeGgzYTR4L2pGekdBMTltRVU3RTZJU
2NQQ2s4bFRqRHdabjNETGVDUmx5WT08L2VuY3J5cHRlZFNlc3Npb25LZXlJ
Vj4NCiAgPHN5bW1ldHJpY0tleVNpemU+NjQ8L3N5bW1ldHJpY0tleVNpemU
+DQogIDxhc3ltbWV0cmljS2V5U2l6ZT4xMDI0PC9hc3ltbWV0cmljS2V5U2
l6ZT4NCiAgPEtleUluZm8+DQogICAgPGVuY3J5cHRpb25NZXRob2Q+UlNBL
UFFUzwvZW5jcnlwdGlvbk1ldGhvZD4NCiAgPC9LZXlJbmZvPg0KPC9LZXlF
eGNoYW5nZVRva2VuPg==</cipherValue></CipherData> 
      <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
    <authenticationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:52.546875+03:00</authenticationEndTime>    
<authenticationMethod>UserName_Password</authenticationMeth
od> 
    <authenticationBeginTime>0001-01-
01T00:00:00</authenticationBeginTime> 
  </AuthenticationStatement> 
  <issueInstant>2008-05-
25T21:41:52.5625+03:00</issueInstant> 
  <issuer>Client</issuer> 
</CipherToken> 
</serializedCipherToken_KeyExchangeToken> 
 
Figure C.1. (cont.) SOAP Message Example For Identity Token Request From Client 
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 <serializedCipherToken_CRI> 
<CipherToken xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
   
<Conditions> 
    <notBefore>2008-05-25T21:41:52.953125+03:00</notBefore> 
    <notOnOrAfter>2008-05-
25T21:56:52.953125+03:00</notOnOrAfter> 
  </Conditions> 
  <AuthenticationStatement>  
    <KeyInfo> 
      <CipherData>        
<cipherValue>y2Y67tnzZzTXNGvZQsU2EI4sKbc32/cJrZkf/p2/U0AWls
rpRhsv1e8tlWrVFlLdtEX5dKgcRxdH8mjGtQbmbtNCc2+p5pArEn26L4oCp
P5EyaX5nQFzzoMBUQgQ5BgMdHOnR1Py/XrKTo8k6Nf817cM8CmfhAUrj7Sp
F7eWpE5UXHYQxmQTpcQTRFZRP5U2lrN6eWi5Ye+tiQVpTsJt+D3K6h0KlSx
/rIhcAyGOPRO874KTvTQQJI3r12Rd2EOIIuclyS/zAnhjMZbrgbl6mFCtDp
5oLqGxy2HtTKl1a2crO+4YRQKCm/Ke+0aI9tU+bf10gQbMkqOBJ22ce66sl
ZYoVEhmfYyAL6o9GGxdS92z171EhvMQZG8jfznUixoITDDrRPob9rqlsHb3
3GattFkDLeOemH7spaQsBKLsKlrPcO5TgP2rinWQBphjaZ0D 
</cipherValue> 
       
</CipherData> 
      <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
    <authenticationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:52.953125+03:00</authenticationEndTime>    
<authenticationMethod>UserName_Password</authenticationMeth 
od> 
 
Figure C.1. (cont.) SOAP Message Example For Identity Token Request From Client 
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    <authenticationBeginTime>0001-01-
01T00:00:00</authenticationBeginTime> 
  </AuthenticationStatement> 
  <issueInstant>2008-05-
25T21:41:52.953125+03:00</issueInstant> 
  <issuer>Client</issuer></CipherToken> 
</serializedCipherToken_CRI> 
    </requestIDToken> 
  </soap:Body> 
</soap:Envelope> 
 
Figure C.1. (cont.) SOAP Message Example For Identity Token Request From Client 
To Identity Token Web Service 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
  <soap:Body> 
    <requestIDTokenResponse xmlns="http://tempuri.org/"> 
      <requestIDTokenResult> 
<CipherToken xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <Conditions> 
    <notBefore>2008-05-25T21:41:54.3125+03:00</notBefore> 
    <notOnOrAfter>2008-05-
25T21:56:54.3125+03:00</notOnOrAfter> 
  </Conditions> 
  <AuthenticationStatement> 
            
Figure C.2. SOAP Message Example For Identity Token Response From Identity STS 
to Client  
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<KeyInfo> 
      <CipherData> 
 
<cipherValue>y2Y67tnzZzTXNGvZQsU2EI4sKbc32/cJrZkf/p2/U0DyUJ
2REyQvKZZn5gz0caNdmXT3nTcOeVKxgJNY5JAql3iHq/XJo1D6h99QrRpTh
Ll7tz7LdGajmAKZ+g1hQef+zMDx9gkzh8+qSkAE84DmTtScP0cRTwUnstJT
+dzEdxlpMffSNvjXLOszdfXyIj0qi1HDEo/xCWQxUDljz2iYbqQHIS2zdeG
zCgEilu3t74lTzeh2gFM1LOobwbqLyGo2801EiCftqojeokMRHnXKFAzXHk
u/lz+5hN1CHl2Cdp4Q4O9jUaVFU5AHeRLGv7+KTLCA+noIMdz1Xc6cpU36X
Pr+kcsWYsztRiRFLdyOTyVwC+GRQR83oIMhaf+Y4wnI 
</cipherValue> 
      </CipherData> 
      <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
    <authenticationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.3125+03:00</authenticationEndTime>    
<authenticationMethod>UsernamePassword</authenticationMetho
d> 
    <authenticationBeginTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:53.640625+03:00</authenticationBeginTime> 
  </AuthenticationStatement> 
  <Signature> 
    <SignedInfo> 
      <signatureAlgorithm>SHA1</signatureAlgorithm> 
    </SignedInfo> 
    
<signatureValue>GD6xPMaN2W9+jM3wTvCbMjP3dqU+gh5ldUxOS6vdERt
X6VKuCE4szcf3Qom5Mv9JL5GPm6+0+badyrKb2iDB4AqQMj8lVyOB9buPcf 
0SoeQM4mhbINIIGiTNmvdRfghpqrKhDAUVZHZ7z/xPvXMvSzUtYDs86+xwJ 
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iEudI9zDp0=</signatureValue> 
  </Signature><issueInstant>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.46875+03:00</issueInstant> 
  <issuer>Client</issuer> 
  <KeyExchangeToken>    
<encryptedSessionKey>rWTnYAhfewJP8vOiMDPLn9MbdIO1AosQTOp759
5hWy6JhfUkQ2MfYgWjPsLEj8thLDPRAd2WmaJl5QkhqkFFKoO9WN2anuMgx
wTDNKRu6Djk28n2zfNfIiwKk2PT5DsDZYGiLyAfDQDSEMHtBU1DAeNZsIzb
hKjicm9kbwlOH/I=</encryptedSessionKey> 
    <symmetricAlgorithmType>AES</symmetricAlgorithmType>    
<encryptedSessionKeyIV>gy9txox+UQRQMPTQWM4SgyjQOtX1TPD3KH9w
tnkRxXl5sBKQKTXTo/aWqc3o5D5x+PpfT9rCWEHjk+OJuf7olEjSnlOKJCE
QKnfQHRKAWU8bhQ++mrIxyMtn1Ax/19/Hxh3a4x/jFzGA19mEU7E6IScPCk
8lTjDwZn3DLeCRlyY=</encryptedSessionKeyIV> 
    <symmetricKeySize>64</symmetricKeySize> 
    <asymmetricKeySize>1024</asymmetricKeySize> 
    <KeyInfo> 
      <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
  </KeyExchangeToken> 
  <CreationTime> 
    <TokenCreationBeginTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.3125+03:00</TokenCreationBeginTime> 
    <TokenCreationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.46875+03:00</TokenCreationEndTime> 
  </CreationTime> 
</CipherToken> 
</requestIDTokenResult></requestIDTokenResponse> 
  </soap:Body> 
</soap:Envelope> 
 
Figure C.2. (cont.) SOAP Message Example For Identity Token Response From 
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-16"?> 
<ClientRequestInfos 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <UserPass> 
    <userName>user0</userName> 
    <password>pass0</password> 
  </UserPass> 
  <requestTime>0001-01-01T00:00:00</requestTime> 
</ClientRequestInfos> 
 
Figure C.3. Client Request Information Open Message  
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-16"?> 
<IDToken xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <lifeTime>2008-05-26T21:41:54.3125+03:00</lifeTime> 
  <requestType>pass0</requestType> 
  <tokenType>user0</tokenType> 
</IDToken> 
 
Figure C.4. IDToken Open Message  
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
  <soap:Body> 
    <requestCreditStatus xmlns="http://tempuri.org/"> 
       
Figure C.5. SOAP Message Example For Credit Status Token Request From Client To 
CreditStatusSTS Web Service  
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<serializedCipherToken_KeyExchangeToken> 
 
<CipherToken xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <Conditions> 
    <notBefore>2008-05-25T21:41:55.109375+03:00</notBefore> 
    <notOnOrAfter>2008-05-
25T21:56:55.109375+03:00</notOnOrAfter> 
  </Conditions> 
  <AuthenticationStatement> 
    <KeyInfo> 
      <CipherData> 
        
<cipherValue>PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0idXRmLT
E2Ij8+DQo8S2V5RXhjaGFuZ2VUb2tlbiB4bWxuczp4c2k9Imh0dHA6Ly93d
3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDEvWE1MU2NoZW1hLWluc3RhbmNlIiB4bWxuczp4c2Q9
Imh0dHA6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDEvWE1MU2NoZW1hIj4NCiAgPGVuY3J
5cHRlZFNlc3Npb25LZXk+RTF1OUNSbTZJcDlEZHZ1V3BXaUx0ZTdTeEhZQ0
FUMVUxY2tkb0J5OE9IbHBjUktQU25pdWZsSkV3MTcrazYydGhzZUZOV0pPU
jVCRUdaSXB3cy8zeUhuUldnT3ZtdUdWUGdJZHVkVHBrbE16Z2xXTGJ4ZDJs
Q1JqMy9rRkwvN1R3M0p2WTRtS3ByNEtWeVJYWnZsMExiTnRDYmJ4MGtzSEd
VL3VrVzVmUWxBPTwvZW5jcnlwdGVkU2Vzc2lvbktleT4NCiAgPHN5bW1ldH
JpY0FsZ29yaXRobVR5cGU+QUVTPC9zeW1tZXRyaWNBbGdvcml0aG1UeXBlP
g0KICA8ZW5jcnlwdGVkU2Vzc2lvbktleUlWPk1wcEZRbVg3aGRzZ2V2dXlv
czVXYUxDSFdZN3Q2THpuY2dNSmF6M2xZenl3b1hCeUdBSy9QaXRac1dpV1h
lc044VCthUTJNSEZWVUN2MFZEUTJBZ0dFWEtVK1RpNFB2SndQK2FaVGsySk 
U5emYyNk1paUt4MWgxcWNmUThQelJpSjM4QmhIcktud0lUZDc2VS9pV1ZNd
0Q0MzN6c1BTRkI1cER6M3R4Q21TRT08L2VuY3J5cHRlZFNlc3Npb25LZXlJ
Vj4NCiAgPHN5bW1ldHJpY0tleVNpemU+NjQ8L3N5bW1ldHJpY0tleVNpemU 
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+DQogIDxhc3ltbWV0cmljS2V5U2l6ZT4xMDI0PC9hc3ltbWV0cmljS2V5U2
l6ZT4NCiAgPEtleUluZm8+DQogICAgPGVuY3J5cHRpb25NZXRob2Q+UlNBL
UFFUzwvZW5jcnlwdGlvbk1ldGhvZD4NCiAgPC9LZXlJbmZvPg0KPC9LZXlF
eGNoYW5nZVRva2VuPg==</cipherValue> 
      </CipherData> 
      <encryptionMethod>RSA-TripleDES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
    <authenticationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:55.109375+03:00</authenticationEndTime>    
<authenticationMethod>UserName_Password</authenticationMeth
od> 
    <authenticationBeginTime>0001-01-
01T00:00:00</authenticationBeginTime> 
  </AuthenticationStatement> 
  <issueInstant>2008-05-
25T21:41:55.109375+03:00</issueInstant> 
  <issuer>Client</issuer> </CipherToken> 
</serializedCipherToken_KeyExchangeToken> 
      <serializedCipherToken_IDtoken> 
 <CipherToken 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <Conditions> 
    <notBefore>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.3125+03:00</notBefore> 
    <notOnOrAfter>2008-05- 
25T21:56:54.3125+03:00</notOnOrAfter> 
  </Conditions> 
  <AuthenticationStatement> 
           
Figure C.5. (cont.) SOAP Message Example For Credit Status Token Request From 
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<KeyInfo> 
<CipherData>        
<cipherValue>y2Y67tnzZzTXNGvZQsU2EI4sKbc32/cJrZkf/p2/U0DyUJ
2REyQvKZZn5gz0caNdmXT3nTcOeVKxgJNY5JAql3iHq/XJo1D6h99QrRpTh
Ll7tz7LdGajmAKZ+g1hQef+zMDx9gkzh8+qSkAE84DmTtScP0cRTwUnstJT
+dzEdxlpMffSNvjXLOszdfXyIj0qi1HDEo/xCWQxUDljz2iYbqQHIS2zdeG
zCgEilu3t74lTzeh2gFM1LOobwbqLyGo2801EiCftqojeokMRHnXKFAzXHk
u/lz+5hN1CHl2Cdp4Q4O9jUaVFU5AHeRLGv7+KTLCA+noIMdz1Xc6cpU36X
Pr+kcsWYsztRiRFLdyOTyVwC+GRQR83oIMhaf+Y4wnI</cipherValue> 
      </CipherData> 
      <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
    <authenticationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.3125+03:00</authenticationEndTime>    
<authenticationMethod>UsernamePassword</authenticationMetho
d> 
    <authenticationBeginTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:53.640625+03:00</authenticationBeginTime> 
  </AuthenticationStatement> 
  <Signature> 
    <SignedInfo> 
      <signatureAlgorithm>SHA1</signatureAlgorithm> 
    </SignedInfo>    
<signatureValue>GD6xPMaN2W9+jM3wTvCbMjP3dqU+gh5ldUxOS6vdERt
X6VKuCE4szcf3Qom5Mv9JL5GPm6+0+badyrKb2iDB4AqQMj8lVyOB9buPcf 
0SoeQM4mhbINIIGiTNmvdRfghpqrKhDAUVZHZ7z/xPvXMvSzUtYDs86+xwJ 
iEudI9zDp0=</signatureValue> 
 </Signature> 
<issueInstant>2008-05- 
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25T21:41:54.46875+03:00</issueInstant> 
   
  <issuer>Client</issuer> 
  <KeyExchangeToken>    
<encryptedSessionKey>rWTnYAhfewJP8vOiMDPLn9MbdIO1AosQTOp759
5hWy6JhfUkQ2MfYgWjPsLEj8thLDPRAd2WmaJl5QkhqkFFKoO9WN2anuMgx
wTDNKRu6Djk28n2zfNfIiwKk2PT5DsDZYGiLyAfDQDSEMHtBU1DAeNZsIzb
hKjicm9kbwlOH/I=</encryptedSessionKey>    
<symmetricAlgorithmType>AES</symmetricAlgorithmType>    
<encryptedSessionKeyIV>gy9txox+UQRQMPTQWM4SgyjQOtX1TPD3KH9w
tnkRxXl5sBKQKTXTo/aWqc3o5D5x+PpfT9rCWEHjk+OJuf7olEjSnlOKJCE
QKnfQHRKAWU8bhQ++mrIxyMtn1Ax/19/Hxh3a4x/jFzGA19mEU7E6IScPCk
8lTjDwZn3DLeCRlyY=</encryptedSessionKeyIV> 
    <symmetricKeySize>64</symmetricKeySize> 
    <asymmetricKeySize>1024</asymmetricKeySize> 
    <KeyInfo> 
      <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
  </KeyExchangeToken> 
  <CreationTime> 
    <TokenCreationBeginTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.3125+03:00</TokenCreationBeginTime> 
    <TokenCreationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.46875+03:00</TokenCreationEndTime> 
  </CreationTime> 
</CipherToken>  
</serializedCipherToken_IDtoken> 
    </requestCreditStatus> 
  </soap:Body> 
</soap:Envelope> 
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
  <soap:Body>    
<requestCreditStatusResponsexmlns="http://tempuri.org/"> 
      <requestCreditStatusResult> 
 CipherToken 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <Conditions> 
    <notBefore>2008-05-
25T21:41:56.28125+03:00</notBefore> 
    <notOnOrAfter>2008-05-
25T21:56:56.28125+03:00</notOnOrAfter> 
  </Conditions> 
  <AuthenticationStatement> 
    <KeyInfo> 
      <CipherData>        
<cipherValue>y2Y67tnzZzTXNGvZQsU2EI4sKbc32/cJrZkf/p2/U0AMpr
2OeH50HcgQzZielTODCjGL8M+/y2iaZXFnxNSR7bLiD3BteytXP0LujYBZk
Pkdfr9JqtbSRjB1vs83uGF2kAVZ6A82ByEQTD4hr7te0l/QGJHP0CkqBId1
aLWmb5Knm5N5EWc2aWziWiEV9M7jIikZh9SUsGJH6qvjgmXOAxUYLH5qlfY
qJReFioKVi6K0cv9o6q0o6I9yqWbPo+7YWxQyXahNEO4KcMFH5H41UuJhc1
42rJG1PiDTFvfB+lzvy0jIGmUQEc06ld6f4DmKuTAHKKEthCbMCwUiWH3MF
KRBR5sNd7ymhR0qJGZAahO/bfWtCNyrO5hPTJOWlnULBpJPVIDkifJOhLVu
1agyGKrs/z3HGfmG17rTEleU6vfjaQ+y7EOcSGmTsHvhJ0C+</cipherVal
ue>       
</CipherData> 
     
Figure C.6. SOAP Message Example For Credit Status Token Response From Credit 
Status Token Web Service To Client 
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  <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
    <authenticationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:55.984375+03:00</authenticationEndTime>    
<authenticationMethod>SignatureAuthentication</authenticati
onMethod><authenticationBeginTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:55.453125+03:00</authenticationBeginTime> 
  </AuthenticationStatement> 
  <Signature> 
    <SignedInfo> 
      <signatureAlgorithm>SHA1</signatureAlgorithm> 
    </SignedInfo>    
<signatureValue>qt/oNbCHxYTIrLl/F/vuaE4DuL6LgCsBxsOGXZj4QXH
R/a7Q2xESaFD2ihBAs6c5yeh3YrtNYjZXasSorbJem5sRMIlnHRuGt7RizE
5F63Wd+XOf88mElilPIooBl0of15T/eDtpFxK5TJ26r5v47nTNInokv0kwK
vDJwAF6FVE=</signatureValue> 
  </Signature> <issueInstant>2008-05- 
25T21:41:56.28125+03:00</issueInstant> 
  <issuer>CreditStatusSTS</issuer> 
  <CreationTime> 
    <TokenCreationBeginTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:55.453125+03:00</TokenCreationBeginTime> 
    <TokenCreationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:56.28125+03:00</TokenCreationEndTime> 
  </CreationTime> 
</CipherToken> 
      </requestCreditStatusResult> 
    </requestCreditStatusResponse> 
  </soap:Body> 
</soap:Envelope> 
 
Figure C.6. (cont.) SOAP Message Example For Credit Status Token Response From 
Credit Status Token Web Service To Client 
 82 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-16"?> 
<CreditStatusToken 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <lifeTime>2008-05-26T21:41:56.125+03:00</lifeTime> 
  <requestType>CreditStatusRequest</requestType> 
  <tokenType>CreditStatusSTSToken</tokenType> 
</CreditStatusToken> 
 
Figure C.7. Credit Status Token Open Message 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<soap:Envelope xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema" 
xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"> 
  <soap:Body> 
    <request xmlns="http://tempuri.org/"> 
      <serializedCipherToken_KeyExchangeToken> 
 <CipherToken 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <Conditions> 
    <notBefore>2008-05-
25T21:41:52.546875+03:00</notBefore> 
    <notOnOrAfter>2008-05-
25T21:56:52.546875+03:00</notOnOrAfter> 
  </Conditions> 
  <AuthenticationStatement> 
    <KeyInfo> 
       
Figure C.8. SOAP Message Example For Service Request From Client to Service Web 
Service 
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<CipherData>        
<cipherValue>PD94bWwgdmVyc2lvbj0iMS4wIiBlbmNvZGluZz0idXRmLT
E2Ij8+DQo8S2V5RXhjaGFuZ2VUb2tlbiB4bWxuczp4c2k9Imh0dHA6Ly93d
3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDEvWE1MU2NoZW1hLWluc3RhbmNlIiB4bWxuczp4c2Q9
Imh0dHA6Ly93d3cudzMub3JnLzIwMDEvWE1MU2NoZW1hIj4NCiAgPGVuY3J
5cHRlZFNlc3Npb25LZXk+cldUbllBaGZld0pQOHZPaU1EUExuOU1iZElPMU
Fvc1FUT3A3NTk1aFd5NkpoZlVrUTJNZllnV2pQc0xFajh0aExEUFJBZDJXb
WFKbDVRa2hxa0ZGS29POVdOMmFudU1neHdURE5LUnU2RGprMjhuMnpmTmZJ
aXdLazJQVDVEc0RaWUdpTHlBZkRRRFNFTUh0QlUxREFlTlpzSXpiaEtqaWN
tOWtid2xPSC9JPTwvZW5jcnlwdGVkU2Vzc2lvbktleT4NCiAgPHN5bW1ldH
JpY0FsZ29yaXRobVR5cGU+QUVTPC9zeW1tZXRyaWNBbGdvcml0aG1UeXBlP
g0KICA8ZW5jcnlwdGVkU2Vzc2lvbktleUlWPmd5OXR4b3grVVFSUU1QVFFX 
TTRTZ3lqUU90WDFUUEQzS0g5d3Rua1J4WGw1c0JLUUtUWFRvL2FXcWMzbzV
ENXgrUHBmVDlyQ1dFSGprK09KdWY3b2xFalNubE9LSkNFUUtuZlFIUktBV1
U4YmhRKyttckl4eU10bjFBeC8xOS9IeGgzYTR4L2pGekdBMTltRVU3RTZJU
2NQQ2s4bFRqRHdabjNETGVDUmx5WT08L2VuY3J5cHRlZFNlc3Npb25LZXlJ
Vj4NCiAgPHN5bW1ldHJpY0tleVNpemU+NjQ8L3N5bW1ldHJpY0tleVNpemU
+DQogIDxhc3ltbWV0cmljS2V5U2l6ZT4xMDI0PC9hc3ltbWV0cmljS2V5U2
l6ZT4NCiAgPEtleUluZm8+DQogICAgPGVuY3J5cHRpb25NZXRob2Q+UlNBL
UFFUzwvZW5jcnlwdGlvbk1ldGhvZD4NCiAgPC9LZXlJbmZvPg0KPC9LZXlF
eGNoYW5nZVRva2VuPg==</cipherValue> 
      </CipherData> 
      <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
    <authenticationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:52.546875+03:00</authenticationEndTime>    
<authenticationMethod>UserName_Password</authenticationMeth
od> 
    <authenticationBeginTime>0001-01- 
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01T00:00:00</authenticationBeginTime> 
 
  </AuthenticationStatement> 
  <issueInstant>2008-05-
25T21:41:52.5625+03:00</issueInstant> 
  <issuer>Client</issuer> 
</CipherToken> 
    </serializedCipherToken_KeyExchangeToken>      
   <serializedCipherToken_IDToken> 
 <CipherToken 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <Conditions> 
    <notBefore>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.3125+03:00</notBefore> 
    <notOnOrAfter>2008-05-25T21:56:54.3125+03:00 
</notOnOrAfter> 
  </Conditions> 
  <AuthenticationStatement> 
    <KeyInfo> 
      <CipherData>        
<cipherValue>y2Y67tnzZzTXNGvZQsU2EI4sKbc32/cJrZkf/p2/U0DyUJ
2REyQvKZZn5gz0caNdmXT3nTcOeVKxgJNY5JAql3iHq/XJo1D6h99QrRpTh
Ll7tz7LdGajmAKZ+g1hQef+zMDx9gkzh8+qSkAE84DmTtScP0cRTwUnstJT
+dzEdxlpMffSNvjXLOszdfXyIj0qi1HDEo/xCWQxUDljz2iYbqQHIS2zdeG
zCgEilu3t74lTzeh2gFM1LOobwbqLyGo2801EiCftqojeokMRHnXKFAzXHk
u/lz+5hN1CHl2Cdp4Q4O9jUaVFU5AHeRLGv7+KTLCA+noIMdz1Xc6cpU36X
Pr+kcsWYsztRiRFLdyOTyVwC+GRQR83oIMhaf+Y4wnI</cipherValue> 
     </CipherData> 
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      <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
    <authenticationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.3125+03:00 
</authenticationEndTime>    
<authenticationMethod>UsernamePassword 
</authenticationMethod> 
    <authenticationBeginTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:53.640625+03:00</authenticationBeginTime> 
  </AuthenticationStatement> 
  <Signature> 
    <SignedInfo> 
      <signatureAlgorithm>SHA1</signatureAlgorithm> 
    </SignedInfo> 
    
<signatureValue>GD6xPMaN2W9+jM3wTvCbMjP3dqU+gh5ldUxOS6vdERt
X6VKuCE4szcf3Qom5Mv9JL5GPm6+0+badyrKb2iDB4AqQMj8lVyOB9buPcf
0SoeQM4mhbINIIGiTNmvdRfghpqrKhDAUVZHZ7z/xPvXMvSzUtYDs86+xwJ
iEudI9zDp0=</signatureValue> 
  </Signature> 
  <issueInstant>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.46875+03:00</issueInstant> 
  <issuer>Client</issuer> 
  <KeyExchangeToken>    
<encryptedSessionKey>rWTnYAhfewJP8vOiMDPLn9MbdIO1AosQTOp759
5hWy6JhfUkQ2MfYgWjPsLEj8thLDPRAd2WmaJl5QkhqkFFKoO9WN2anuMgx
wTDNKRu6Djk28n2zfNfIiwKk2PT5DsDZYGiLyAfDQDSEMHtBU1DAeNZsIzb
hKjicm9kbwlOH/I=</encryptedSessionKey>    
<symmetricAlgorithmType>AES</symmetricAlgorithmType>     
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<encryptedSessionKeyIV>gy9txox+UQRQMPTQWM4SgyjQOtX1TPD3KH9w
tnkRxXl5sBKQKTXTo/aWqc3o5D5x+PpfT9rCWEHjk+OJuf7olEjSnlOKJCE
QKnfQHRKAWU8bhQ++mrIxyMtn1Ax/19/Hxh3a4x/jFzGA19mEU7E6IScPCk
8lTjDwZn3DLeCRlyY=</encryptedSessionKeyIV> 
    <symmetricKeySize>64</symmetricKeySize> 
    <asymmetricKeySize>1024</asymmetricKeySize> 
    <KeyInfo> 
      <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
  </KeyExchangeToken> 
  <CreationTime> 
    <TokenCreationBeginTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:54.3125+03:00</TokenCreationBeginTime> 
    <TokenCreationEndTime>2008-05- 
25T21:41:54.46875+03:00</TokenCreationEndTime> 
  </CreationTime> 
</CipherToken> 
   </serializedCipherToken_IDToken> 
      <serializedCipherToken_CreditStatusToken> 
   <CipherToken 
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" 
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
  <Conditions> 
    <notBefore>2008-05-25T21:41:56.28125+03:00</notBefore> 
    <notOnOrAfter>2008-05-
25T21:56:56.28125+03:00</notOnOrAfter> 
  </Conditions> 
  <AuthenticationStatement> 
    <KeyInfo> 
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 <CipherData>        
<cipherValue>y2Y67tnzZzTXNGvZQsU2EI4sKbc32/cJrZkf/p2/U0AMpr
2OeH50HcgQzZielTODCjGL8M+/y2iaZXFnxNSR7bLiD3BteytXP0LujYBZk
Pkdfr9JqtbSRjB1vs83uGF2kAVZ6A82ByEQTD4hr7te0l/QGJHP0CkqBId1
aLWmb5Knm5N5EWc2aWziWiEV9M7jIikZh9SUsGJH6qvjgmXOAxUYLH5qlfY
qJReFioKVi6K0cv9o6q0o6I9yqWbPo+7YWxQyXahNEO4KcMFH5H41UuJhc1
42rJG1PiDTFvfB+lzvy0jIGmUQEc06ld6f4DmKuTAHKKEthCbMCwUiWH3MF
KRBR5sNd7ymhR0qJGZAahO/bfWtCNyrO5hPTJOWlnULBpJPVIDkifJOhLVu
1agyGKrs/z3HGfmG17rTEleU6vfjaQ+y7EOcSGmTsHvhJ0C+</cipherVal
ue>      </CipherData> 
      <encryptionMethod>RSA-AES</encryptionMethod> 
    </KeyInfo> 
    <authenticationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:55.984375+03:00</authenticationEndTime> 
<authenticationMethod>SignatureAuthentication</authenticati
onMethod> 
    <authenticationBeginTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:55.453125+03:00</authenticationBeginTime> 
  </AuthenticationStatement> 
  <Signature> 
    <SignedInfo> 
      <signatureAlgorithm>SHA1</signatureAlgorithm> 
    </SignedInfo>    
<signatureValue>qt/oNbCHxYTIrLl/F/vuaE4DuL6LgCsBxsOGXZj4QXH
R/a7Q2xESaFD2ihBAs6c5yeh3YrtNYjZXasSorbJem5sRMIlnHRuGt7RizE
5F63Wd+XOf88mElilPIooBl0of15T/eDtpFxK5TJ26r5v47nTNInokv0kwK
vDJwAF6FVE=</signatureValue> 
  </Signature> 
  <issueInstant>2008-05- 
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25T21:41:56.28125+03:00</issueInstant> 
  <issuer>CreditStatusSTS</issuer> 
  <CreationTime> 
    <TokenCreationBeginTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:55.453125+03:00</TokenCreationBeginTime> 
    <TokenCreationEndTime>2008-05-
25T21:41:56.28125+03:00</TokenCreationEndTime> 
  </CreationTime> 
</CipherToken> 
     </serializedCipherToken_CreditStatusToken> 
    </request> 
  </soap:Body> 
</soap:Envelope> 
 
Figure C.8. (cont.) SOAP Message Example For Service Request From Client to 
Service Web Service 
 
